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Ballot Design as Fail-Safe: An Ounce of Rotation
Is Worth a Pound of Litigation
Mary Beth Beazley
ABSTRACT
For generations, some candidates have argued that first-listed candidates gain ‘‘extra’’ votes due to pri-
macy effect, recommending ballot rotation to solve the problem. These votes, however, are generally
intentional votes, accurately cast, and rotation is controversial. This article argues that rotation is appro-
priate because it mitigates the electoral impact of not only primacy effect, but also of two categories of
miscast votes. First, rotation mitigates the impact of proximity-mistake votes, which can occur even on
well-designed ballots when voters mis-vote for a candidate in proximity to their chosen candidate. Sec-
ond, rotation mitigates the impact of mis-votes caused by flawed ballot designs, providing a fail-safe that
can prevent some electoral meltdowns. Ballot rotation represents a last-best-chance to avoid the electoral
impact of foreseeable and unforeseeable voter error and ballot design issues. Although the impact is small
for each of these kinds of voter behavior, some elections are won in the margins. Further, because post-
election fixes are both costly and ineffective, states should use election procedures that minimize the
need for post-election litigation. Legislators should enact precinct-level rotation to evenly distribute
the benefits and burdens of various ballot positions and to promote election results that more accurately
reflect the choice of the electorate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Human beings—even smart human beings—make certain predictable mistakes when they
interact with visual information. As an example,
count the number of times that the letter ‘‘F’’ appears
in the following sentence:
FINISHED FILES ARE THE RESULT OF
YEARSOFSCIENTIFICSTUDYCOMBINED
WITH THE EXPERIENCE OF YEARS.1
Most people who take this test come up with the
wrong answer. In fact, the vast majority come up
Mary Beth Beazley is an associate professor of law at The Ohio
State University Moritz College of Law in Columbus, OH. This
article would have been impossible without the help of many
people, some of whom I will no doubt forget to thank. I am
especially grateful to Dean Monte Smith, who insisted that I
move it back to the front burner, and who read many drafts
and made many helpful suggestions. I also thank the research
assistants who have provided work and guidance over its long
gestation, including Melissa Jackson, Dianna Parker, Bartholo-
mew Freeze, and Nathan Geary; the librarians and colleagues
who have read drafts, suggested research paths, and provided
guidance, including Carole Hinchcliff, Kathy Hall, and Mat-
thew Cooper; Terri Enns, Steve Johansen, Debby Merritt,
Joshua Stulberg, Donald Tobin, and especially Suzanne
Rowe, Ned Foley, Dan Tokaji, Jessica Slavin, and Steve Huefner;
Ellis Jacobs and Paul S. Herrnson, for their responses to research
queries; the anonymous reviewers from the Election Law Journal;
and those who gave comments at workshops at the Legal Writing
Institute, Marquette University Law School, and the Moritz College
of Law. Dean Alan Michaels and The Ohio State University Moritz
College of Law provided generous research support. Finally, I thank
in particular my husband, David Pillion, and my brother, Michael
Beazley, who first alerted me to the concept of rotation and whose
knowledge of Ohio election practices and procedures proved invalu-
able.
1My niece Lisa Beazley Kling sent me this little parlor trick
while she worked as an editor at a publishing house. I don’t
know its origin, but this example of cognitive befuddlement
is widely available on the Internet. E.g., < http://www.uscg
.mil/safety/docs/TCT/tctigcases.pdf > at I-31.
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with the same wrong answer.2 Failing the test helps
people to realize that their eyes (and brains) will
sometimes play tricks on them when they interact
with visual information.
So why does that matter? It matters because in
the United States, we interact with visual informa-
tion to exercise one of our most precious rights.
As the United States Supreme Court has often
observed, it is a ‘‘‘fundamental principle of our rep-
resentative democracy,’ embodied in the Constitu-
tion, that ‘the people should choose whom they
please to govern them.’’’3 The people make that
choice by interacting with visual information in a
particular way: by using a ballot to vote.4
In the eighteenth century, United States voters
were often allowed to fashion their own ballots to
bring to the polls, or to bring ballots produced by
political parties.5 Now, however, the government con-
trols the voting process more directly, and it mandates
the configuration of the ballot that absentee voters,
early voters, and Election Day voters must complete,
requiring that voters may use only a specific, govern-
ment-issued ballot.6 When governments take on the
responsibility of mandating a particular ballot and
then designing that ballot, they become ‘‘choice
architects,’’7 that is, they design the structures that
people use to exercise a choice. In the case of elec-
tions, election administrators design—or choose the
design of—the ballots that voters use to select the
holders of dozens of national, state, county, and
local offices.8 Because governments require voters
to use a specific ballot to exercise their most funda-
mental right of citizenship, they have an obligation
to ensure that the ballot does not needlessly interfere
with the exercise of that right.
As Sunstein and Thaler wrote in Nudge, their land-
mark work on behavioral economics, choice archi-
tects are controlling ‘‘the context in which people
make decisions,’’ and they must be aware that
‘‘small and apparently insignificant details can have
major impacts on people’s behavior.’’9 In a cafeteria,
for example, you’re more likely to get dessert if it’s
at eye level.10 In the retirement context, the seemingly
insignificant detail of whether a retirement savings
program is designed with an opt-in feature as opposed
to an opt-out feature can have a huge impact on the
amount of money that people save for retirement,
and thus, on their health and well-being during retire-
ment.11 And in the electoral context, seemingly insig-
nificant details about ballot technology—i.e., the
2I have given this test to over 2,000 people. My method is cer-
tainly not scientific; participants raise their hands to respond. A
few people see two F’s, while almost all see three F’s, which is
half as many F’s as there really are. If you got it right, congrat-
ulations (particularly if you have never taken this test or a sim-
ilar one). I hypothesize that the reason most of us don’t see the
correct number of F’s is that our subconscious translates the F’s
in the word of to V’s. The lesson to learn is that our subcon-
scious is sometimes busier than we imagine, and it sometimes
gives us wrong information (the number of F’s) that we then
act on (by delivering a wrong answer).
3U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995) (citing
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)) (holding that states could not ban mem-
bers of Congress from appearing on the ballot after certain
number of terms, even if it allowed them to be elected via
write-in votes).
4This article will not address the important issues concerning
the voting rights of people with visual disabilities. See e.g.,
Daniel P. Tokaji and Ruth Colker, Absentee Voting by People
with Disabilities, 38 McGeorge L. Rev. 1015, 1016 (2007)
(noting that certain federal statutes have ‘‘helped improve the
accessibility of polling places [but that] they have not fulfilled
their promise of ensuring accessible voting for all persons with
disabilities’’ (citation omitted)).
5Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 200-01 (1992) (noting that
‘‘[i]ndividual voters made their own handwritten ballots,
marked them in the privacy of their homes, and then brought
them to the polls for counting,’’ and that political parties later
produced ballots in bright colors that could be recognized
from a distance so that party officials could be sure for
whom voters were casting their ballots) (citing S. Albright,
The American Ballot 14–20 (1942); E. Evans, A His-
tory of the Australian Ballot System in the United
States 5, 7, 11 (1917); J. Harris, Election Administra-
tion in the United States 9–14, 17, 151–52 (1934); V.
Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups 649
(1952); J. Reynolds, Testing Democracy: Electoral
Behavior and Progressive Reform in New Jersey,
1880–1920, p. 36 (1988); J. Rusk, The Effect of the Aus-
tralian Ballot Reform on Split Ticket Voting: 1876–
1908, pp. 8–23 (1968)).
6E.g.,N.D. Cent. Code x 16.1-06-03 (‘‘Ballots other than official
ballots prepared by the county auditor or local auditor or clerk may
not be cast or counted in any election governed by this title.’’).
7Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge:
Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happi-
ness 3 (2008 Yale University Press).
8E.g., Joanne M. Miller and Jon A. Krosnick, The Impact of
Candidate Name Order on Election Outcomes, 62 Pub. Opin-
ion Q. 291, 292 (Issue 3, 1998) (noting that ‘‘[c]ontemporary
American elections often confront voters with tremendously
challenging tasks,’’ and that ‘‘in all states, voters have some-
times been asked to make choices in well over two dozen con-
tests, ranging from high visibility contests to contests for offices
so obscure that many voters probably could not describe the job
responsibilities associated with them’’).
9Thaler and Sunstein, supra note 7, at 3.
10See id. at 1.
11Id. at 248–49.
BALLOT DESIGN AS FAIL-SAFE 19
papers, machines, and other devices that we use to
vote—can affect who people decide to vote for,
whether they cast a vote at all, and, most significantly,
whether they are able to vote accurately or validly.12
Ballot technology and design received a great deal
of attention after the troubles of the 2000 presidential
election, when much of the public became aware that
certain ballot designs predictably caused voters to cast
invalid votes or wrong votes.13 Appropriately, reform-
ers have focused on reducing the number of so-called
‘‘residual votes.’’14 ‘‘Residual vote’’ is the term used to
describe contests in which a voter does not cast a valid
vote. A residual vote can be an ‘‘undervote’’ (i.e., a
contest with a non-registered vote) or an ‘‘overvote’’
(i.e., a contest with more votes registered than is
allowed, resulting in no vote being counted for
that contest). This article suggests that too little
attention has been paid to a different design-related
problem: votes that are valid, but that were influ-
enced in some way by the position of particular
candidates15 within each contest. I call these
votes position-influenced votes.
While there may be many different ways in
which position on the ballot influences voters, this
article will concentrate on three categories of posi-
tion-influenced votes. These are primacy-effect
votes, proximity-mistake votes, and ballot-flaw-
induced votes:
(1) Primacy-effect votes are accurately cast votes
cast by a small percentage of voters who
were influenced in a predictable way16 to
vote for or against a particular candidate. Typ-
ically, voters are influenced to vote for the can-
didate listed first on the ballot for a particular
contest.17 A primacy-effect vote is a position-
influenced vote because the position of the
candidate’s name influenced the voter’s deci-
sion as to who to vote for.
(2) Proximity-mistake votes are miscast votes that
occur when the voter mistakenly votes for a
candidate whose name is adjacent to the
name of the voter’s chosen candidate; these
mistaken votes can occur even on well-
designed ballots. Proximity mistake votes are
more likely when the name of a voter’s candi-
date is located in a disfavored position on the
ballot, one that is more difficult to find or
more difficult to vote for accurately. For exam-
ple, a candidate whose name is at the beginning
12E.g., Miller and Krosnick, supra note 8, at 293–94 (‘‘One psy-
chological theory of order effects predicts ‘primacy effects,’
which are biases toward selecting the first object considered in a
set..This theory is consistent with dozens of experiments that pre-
sented objects visually and nearly always found bias toward select-
ing initially offered options.’’) (citations omitted); Ned Augenblick
and Scott Nicholson, Choice Fatigue: the Effect of Making Pre-
vious Choices on Decision Making, at 23 (Apr. 2009), available
at <http://www.stanford.edu/*ned789/Choice_Fatigue.pdf>
(‘‘We find that voters are more likely to abstain and more likely
to rely on decision shortcuts, such as voting for the status quo or
the first candidate listed in a contest, as the ballot position of a con-
test falls.’’); Lawrence Norden, David Kimball, Whitney
Quesenbery, and Margaret Chen, Better Ballots 24–27
(Brennan Ctr. for Justice at NYU 2008), available at <http://brennan
.3cdn.net/d6bd3c56be0d0cc861_hlm6i92vl.pdf> (noting that a Sar-
asota County ballot violated good design principles by putting two
contests on the same computer screen, probably leading more than
13% of voters to skip a two-candidate congressional contest, which
was located at the top of the same screen as a gubernatorial contest
that listed 12 candidates for governor and lieutenant-governor and
tookup thevastmajority of the screen);Southwest Voter Registration
Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 882, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (enjoin-
ing California Secretary of State from conducting an election in
which some counties would use error-prone punchcard ballots
while others used more modern voting technologies), rev’d en
banc, 344 F.3d 914, 919–20 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that electoral
impact of potential errors was ‘‘merely a speculative possibility’’).
13Jonathan N. Wand, Kenneth W. Shotts, Jasjeet S. Sekhon,
Walter R. Mebane, Jr., Michael C. Herron, and Henry E.
Brady, The Butterfly Did It: The Aberrant Vote for Buchanan
in Palm Beach County, Florida, 95 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 793,
803 (2001) (conducting intensive study of ballots in Palm
Beach County and concluding that ‘‘the butterfly ballot caused
systematic voting errors in [Palm Beach County]’’); see also
Richard G. Niemi and Paul S. Herrnson, Beyond the Butterfly:
The Complexity of U.S. Ballots, 1 Perspectives on Politics
317, 324 (2003) (observing that structural problems are not
alone and concluding that badly written instructions and other
problems lead voters ‘‘to mismark, fail to mark, or spoil their
ballots’’).
14E.g., Norden et al., supra note 12, at 19 (‘‘Residual’’ or
‘‘lost’’ votes ‘‘are typically calculated as the difference between
the number of people voting and the number of valid votes cast
for a particular office. Residual votes can be undervotes (not
selecting any choice on the ballot, either accidentally or inten-
tionally) or overvotes (selecting too many choices, usually acci-
dentally).’’ (citation omitted)).
15This article will use the term ‘‘candidates,’’ but the conclu-
sions of this article may also apply to other voting options,
e.g., contests in which voters are deciding whether to vote
‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ on a ballot issue.
16E.g., Augenblick and Nicholson, supra note 12, at 23 (noting
that voters who have many voting decisions to make will likely
rely on ‘‘decision shortcuts’’ such as voting for the first candi-
date in a contest).
17This type of vote is based on a type of position impact often
referred to as position bias or primacy effect. E.g., Jonathan G.
S. Koppell and Jennifer A. Steen, The Effects of Ballot Position
on Election Outcomes, 66 J. Pol. 267, 269 (2004).
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or end of a list of three or more names is eas-
ier to find, and to vote for accurately, than a
candidate whose name appears in the middle
of the list.18 Voters may be unwilling or
unable to spend the time or cognitive costs
needed to vote accurately for a candidate
whose name is located in that disfavored
position on the ballot, so the vote is a
position-influenced vote because the dis-
favored position influenced the voter’s abili-
ty to cast the vote correctly.
(3) Ballot-flaw-induced votes are miscast votes
caused by ballots with design flaws that pre-
dictably lead a percentage of voters to make
certain categories of mistakes when voting.19
The ‘‘butterfly ballot’’ used in Palm Beach
County, Florida in the 2000 presidential elec-
tion is the most famous example of a ballot
that caused voters to cast this kind of mistaken
position-influenced vote.20 Like a proximity-
mistake vote, a ballot-flaw-induced vote is
a position-influenced vote because the posi-
tion of the candidate’s name on the ballot
influenced the voter’s ability to cast the vote
correctly.
Position-influenced votes are more harmful to
the franchise than residual votes. While residual
votes may reflect a vote not counted in a particular
contest, position-influenced votes may do more than
take away a vote from a voter’s preferred candidate:
they may award a vote to the opponent of a voter’s
preferred candidate.
Any measurable changes in vote totals are impor-
tant because close elections are not unusual.21
Position-influenced votes may account for a change
of vote totals from 1–5% (from primacy-effect
votes),22 .25% to 2–3% or more (proximity-mistake
votes),23 or .5% to more than 1% (ballot-flaw-
induced votes).24 Accordingly, any of these kinds
18Paul S. Herrnson, Richard G. Niemi, Michael J.
Hanmer, Benjamin B. Bederson, Frederick C. Conrad,
and Michael W. Traugott, Voting Technology: The
Not-So-Simple Act of Casting a Ballot 195, n. 16 (Brook-
ings Institute Press 2008) (noting that voters who planned to
vote for either the first or last candidate on a list committed
fewer proximity errors than those who intended to vote for can-
didates other than the first or last candidate—i.e., those in the
middle of the list).
19E.g., Norden et al., supra note 12, at 9 (‘‘[T]here is a
respectable argument that poor ballot design and confusing
instructions have resulted in far more lost votes than software
glitches, programming errors, or machine breakdowns. As
this report demonstrates, poor ballot design and instruction
have caused the loss of tens and sometimes hundreds of thou-
sands of votes in nearly every election year’’) (emphasis in orig-
inal).
20E.g., Wand et al., supra note 13, at 803.
21Many contests are decided by close margins. Norden
et al., supra note 12, at 9 (‘‘All too often, the loss of votes
and rate of errors resulting from these mistakes are greater
than the margin of victory between the two leading candi-
dates. As the examples in this report show, problems caused
by poor ballot design and instructions recur in American elec-
tions, regardless of the type of voting technology a jurisdiction
has used.’’). Victory margins of less than 1% are not unusual
even in significant contests (e.g., the 2000 presidential, 2004
Washington gubernatorial, and 2008 Minnesota U.S. Senate
contests were all decided by margins of less than 1%). See
also Sonneman v. State, 969 P.2d 632, 639 n. 7 (Alaska
1998) (accepting as true allegation that primacy effect affects
5–7% of votes cast, and that elections in Alaska are ‘‘often
decided by margins less than 5%’’).
22E.g., Jon A. Krosnick, Joanne M. Miller, and Michael P.
Tichy, An Unrecognized Need for Ballot Reform: The Effects
of Candidate Name Order on Election Outcomes, in Rethink-
ing the Vote: The Politics and Prospects of American
Election Reform 51, 66 (A.N. Crigler, M.R. Just, and E.J.
McCaffery eds., Oxford University Press, 2004) (giving results
of a study of the 2000 elections in Ohio and North Dakota and
reporting primacy effects in two-candidate contests that ranged
from 1.41% to 6.32%, with an average of 2.88%); Daniel E. Ho
and Kosuke Imai, Estimating Causal Effects of Ballot Order
from a Randomized Natural Experiment: The California Alpha-
bet Lottery, 1978–2002, 72 Pub. Opinion Q. 216, 230, 236
(2008) (finding a primacy effect between 1% and 2% in primary
contests, but no primacy effect for major candidates in general
elections).
23Erzo F.P. Luttmer and Kelly Shue, Who Misvotes? The Effect
of Differential Cognition Costs on Electoral Outcomes, at 32
(November 2006), available at < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id = 902394 > (analyzing California
gubernatorial recall election and concluding that misvotes due
to proximity mistakes ‘‘accounted for at least .25% of all
votes cast’’); Herrnson et al., supra note 18, at 73 (in
study of more than 1,500 subjects, finding 2–3% error rate in
simplest voting tasks, and a higher error rate in more complex
voting tasks).
24See Norden et al., supra note 12, at 33 (citing Ellis Jacobs,
Spoiled Ballots: Under and Overvotes in the 2004 General
Election in Montgomery County, Ohio 4 (Feb. 15, 2005) (article
on file with the author); (noting average 2.6% error rate in pre-
cincts with confusing ballot design, as compared to average
1.1% error rates in precincts in which ballot design was less
confusing). See also Wand et al., supra note 13, at 803 (con-
ducting intensive study of ballots in Palm Beach County and
identifying an error rate that computes to at least .74% and con-
cluding that ‘‘[h]ad [Palm Beach County] used a ballot format
in the presidential contest that did not lead to systematic biased
voting errors, our findings suggest that, other things equal, Al
Gore would have won a majority of the officially certified
votes in Florida.’’).
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of position-influenced votes, alone or in concert
with another, could change the outcome of a suffi-
ciently close election.25
It is probably impossible to eliminate position-
influenced votes completely. No matter how much
time and money candidates and election officials
spend on educating voters, there will remain a
small—and potentially electorally significant—per-
centage of voters whose voting decisions are
affected by primacy effect.26 Likewise, it is axiom-
atic that human beings make mistakes in all con-
texts, and that they will continue to make mistakes
when casting votes, particularly when their pre-
ferred candidate is in a disfavored location such as
the middle of a list.27 Finally, while improvements
in ballot design may reduce the chances of ballot-
flaw-induced votes, new designs can lead to new
mistakes.28
Although election administrators cannot com-
pletely eliminate position-influenced votes, they can
almost always eliminate electoral impact result-
ing from all three of these categories of position-
influenced votes with a simple design change that
is already in use in several states. States can stop
using fixed-position ballots—that is, ballots on
which the candidate names in each contest appear
in the same position and the same order on all bal-
lots in the relevant jurisdiction. Instead, they can
use rotated ballots—that is, they can implement
an effective system of ballot rotation. On rotated
ballots, candidate names take turns in the various
positions in the contest, in the same way that chil-
dren take turns riding in the good and bad seats in a
car on a long trip.
The best system of ballot rotation would rotate
names by ballot, ensuring that each candidate’s
name would appear in each position on the contest
list on an approximately equal number of ballots.29
States should at least, however, rotate names by
precinct: thus, each candidate’s name should
appear in each position on the contest list in an
approximately equal number of precincts. Pre-
cinct-level ballot rotation can mitigate the electoral
impact of all three kinds of position-influenced
votes. Any primacy-effect votes would be spread
among all candidates in a contest. More impor-
tantly, rotation would spread the burden of disfa-
vored locations in the contest list—and the
proximity-mistake votes that result—by allowing
all candidates equal or nearly equal time in the
favored and disfavored positions. Finally, ballot
rotation could provide a fail-safe to prevent the
25Twenty states and the District of Columbia have laws that
trigger automatic recounts for some or all contests when elec-
tions are particularly close. Four of these 20 states (and the Dis-
trict) require a recount when the margin of victory is 1% or less.
The rest of the 20 states have automatic recount laws that are
triggered only when the margin is .5% or smaller. These laws
indicate both that margins larger than .5% - 1% (and thus
within 5%) are more common and that states are less likely to
closely examine voting processes when the margin is bigger
than 1%. See generally the State Recount Laws Searchable
Database created by the Minnesota Center for Electoral Integ-
rity, available at < http://ceimn.org/ceimn-state-recount-laws-
searchable-database > .
26E.g., Marc Meredith and Yuval Salant, Causes and Conse-
quences of Ballot Order-Effects, Stanford Institute for
Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 06-29
at 3 (Feb. 2007) (concluding that voters who must select
more than one candidate in a contest (e.g., in a city council con-
test) may be less likely to vote for a candidate whose name
is positioned immediately after the name of a very popular
candidate).
27Herrnson et al., supra note 18, at 195, n. 16 (noting that
voters who planned to vote for either the first or last candidate
on a list committed fewer proximity errors than those who
intended to vote for candidates other than the first or last candi-
date—i.e., those in the middle of the list).
28As one author noted, after the butterfly ballot debacle,
‘‘[s]tates.invested millions of dollars to update voting sys-
tems, but the design of touch-screen and paper-based optical
scan ballots is often as confusing and thoughtless as that of
the punchcard ballots they replaced.’’ Marcia Lausen,
Design for Democracy: Ballot +Election Design 8
(University of Chicago Press 2007).
29The focus of this article is a rotation system that rotates the
order of names within a given contest. Some scholars advocate
rotating contests, because ballot fatigue has more of an impact
later in the ballot, thus increasing chances of primacy effect
and abstention. See Augenblick and Nicholson, supra note
12, at 23 (‘‘We find that voters are more likely to abstain
and more likely to rely on decision shortcuts, such as voting
for the status quo or the first candidate listed in a contest, as
the ballot position of a contest falls.’’). Other scholars recom-
mend re-ordering names in each contest as well as rotating
them, observing that candidates in multi-vote-contests (e.g.,
city council), lose voteshare if their names are listed immedi-
ately after (or occasionally immediately before) those of high-
popularity candidates. See Meredith and Salant, supra note
26, at 24 (‘‘Finally, our results have implications for the
study of choice and decision making in other real world set-
tings. They suggest that a decision maker evaluating an alter-
native is affected not only by its position but also by the
alternative listed immediately before.’’).
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impact of systemic harms caused by flawed ballot
designs that lead to ballot-flaw-induced votes,
votes whose mistakes all go one way on fixed-
position ballots.30
This article argues that ballot design should take
into account the way that human beings actually
vote in order to fairly distribute the predictable ben-
efits and burdens of ballot position. Specifically, it
recommends that states implement precinct-level
ballot rotation systems31 to mitigate the electoral
impact of all three categories of position-influenced
votes. Part II of this article briefly examines the
ways in which United States ballots are designed
and explains some of the ways in which states orga-
nize their fixed-position or rotated ballots. Part III
explains how election results can be affected by
unavoidable ballot realities that can influence vot-
ers’ decision-making processes or lead them to
miscast their votes. Finally, Part IV discusses jus-
tifications for ballot rotation, examines why liti-
gation may not be the best way to reach this
goal, and explains why legislators might have
good reasons to implement precinct-level rotation
systems.
II. TYPICAL BALLOT DESIGNS
In the United States, ballot design is a highly
decentralized activity.32 Article I, Section 4 of the
United States Constitution provides that ‘‘The
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in
each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Con-
gress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations.’’33 Historically, the federal government
has left ballot design to the states. For example, all
states now use an official ballot that voters mark in
relative privacy (also known as the ‘‘Australian bal-
lot’’).34 This method was not, however, mandated
by the federal government. As evidence of the strong
decentralization of ballot design, one of the first
jurisdictions to adopt the secret ballot was a city
(Louisville, Kentucky, in 1888), although the prac-
tice soon spread nationwide.35
Since the 2000 election, most states have
moved away from punch card and lever machine
voting systems, thanks mainly to funding made
available by the Help America Vote Act
(HAVA).36 However, while state decisions to
30It is estimated that the butterfly ballot cost Al Gore at least
2,000 votes in the 2000 presidential election. Wand et al.,
supra note 13, at 795. George W. Bush, who was listed first
on the ballot, won the State of Florida by 537 votes, according
to the Election Results compiled by the Federal Elections Com-
mission, available at < http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2000/
2000presge.htm#FL > . If names on the butterfly ballot had
been rotated, it is possible that Gore would have gained enough
votes (when Gore was in favored locations on the ballot), and
Bush would have lost enough votes (when Bush was in disfa-
vored locations on the ballot) to neutralize the impact of the
poor design problem, thus changing the result of that election.
31The most effective ballot rotation system would probably
rotate names from ballot to ballot; at the very least, an effective
rotation system would rotate names by precinct rather than
by larger electoral units. See infra note 53 (contrasting Ohio’s
rotation-by-precinct statute with California’s rotation-by-
assembly-district statute).
32E.g., Daniel P. Tokaji, The Birth and Rebirth of Election
Administration, 6 Election L. J. 118, 121 (2007), reviewing
Roy G. Saltman, The History and Politics of Voting
Technology: In Quest of Integrity and Public Confi-
dence (cited in Heather K. Gerken, The Democracy
Index 4 (Princeton University Press 2009)).
33The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) did not mandate changes
in voting technology; instead, it made funds available to states
to improve voting technology and help states replace punchcard
and lever machines. See 42 U.S.C. x 15302.
34Burt Neuborne, Buckley’s Analytical Flaws, 6 J.L. & Pol’y
111, 118 (1997). The right to a secret ballot has generally
been granted not by the federal government, but by the states.
See, e.g., John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2834
(2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing history of public vot-
ing in the United States after observing that ‘‘[w]e have
acknowledged the existence of a First Amendment interest in
voting.but we have never said that it includes the right to
vote anonymously’’). In 1981, the Sixth Circuit observed that
‘‘the [U.S.] Constitution does not specifically guarantee that a
person has a right to a secret ballot, [but] such a right has
been recognized as one of the fundamental civil liberties of
our democracy. In order to protect the secrecy of the ballot,
many states have enacted constitutional provisions dictating
that all ballots must be cast under the cloak of complete priva-
cy.’’ Anderson v. Mills, 664 F.2d 600, 608 (6th Cir. 1981).
HAVA does not mandate a secret ballot, but does mandate
that voters have a ‘‘private’’ opportunity to correct voting errors.
42 U.S.C. x 15481 requires that certain voting systems must
‘‘provide the voter with the opportunity (in a private and inde-
pendent manner) to change the ballot or correct any error before
the ballot is cast and counted.’’
35E.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. at 204. The Commonwealth
of Massachusetts and the State of New York also adopted the
Australian Ballot that year. Further, ‘‘[t]he triumphs of 1888 set
off a rapid and widespread adoption of the Australian system
in the United States. By 1896, almost 90 percent of the States
had adopted the Australian system. This accounted for 92 percent
of the national electorate.’’ Id. at 204-05 (citations omitted).
36E.g., Building Confidence in U.S. Elections: Report
of the Commission on Federal Election Reform 25
(Sept. 2005), available at < http://www1.american.edu/ia/
cfer/report/full_report.pdf > (hereinafter Carter-Baker
Report); see also 42 U.S.C. x 15302.
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reject old election technology were perhaps moti-
vated by the federal government, each state
retained the authority to decide what system it
would move to.37
Although HAVA has resulted in multiple new
rules and guidelines, many crucial ballot design
decisions are still in the hands of state legislatures,38
with some decisions delegated to the local level.
Legislators or election officials decide what kind
of voting technology to use and how to arrange
the contests on the ballot, including whether to put
issues contests before candidate contests, the order
in which to arrange candidate contests, how many
contests to put on a page or screen, how to arrange
contests in columns, whether to use the slate or
office block method for candidate contests, and,
finally, the order in which to list candidate names
or issue choices within each contest.39 Each one
of these decisions can have an impact on how
quickly and accurately voters cast their ballots,
and even on whether they will notice certain con-
tests in order to cast votes in them.40 In many states,
election officials do not focus on good design, leav-
ing these decisions in the hands not of design
experts, but of partisans.41
States generally order contests in a similar
way, moving from national elections to statewide
elections to local elections. There is little unifor-
mity, however, in how states use—or don’t use—
rotation.
A. Slate v. office block ballots
As recently as the 1960s, most states used a style
of ballot organized around political parties.42 These
ballots, known as ‘‘slate ballots’’ or ‘‘party column
ballots,’’ list each party’s entire slate of candidates,
in order of contest. Many of these ballots are set up
like a table, with parties on the vertical axis and offi-
ces on the horizontal axis (or vice versa). Because
minor parties may field candidates for only one or
two contests, slate ballots are almost always orga-
nized with the slates of the two major parties listed
first and second.43 Slate ballots make it easy for vot-
ers to vote a ‘‘straight ticket’’ ballot, because they
need only to move down or across the ballot, voting
37See 42 U.S.C.A. x 15485 (‘‘The specific choices on the meth-
ods of complying with the requirements of this subchapter shall
be left to the discretion of the State.’’) (referring to Subchapter
III: ‘‘UNIFORM AND NONDISCRIMINATORY ELECTION
TECHNOLOGY AND ADMINISTRATION REQUIRE-
MENTS’’).
38Further, even though the Constitution grants authority to the
states, legislatures delegate many of these decisions to the
county level. In some states, ballot design may vary signifi-
cantly from county to county. E.g., Barney Warf, Voting Tech-
nologies and Residual Ballots in the 2000 and 2004
Presidential Elections, 25 Political Geography 530, 531
(Issue 5, June 2006) (‘‘Because the decision to adopt various
types of voting technologies is typically (but not always)
made at the county level, generally by county elections super-
visors, there are wide geographic variations among counties
in the types of technologies deployed and their effectiveness.’’).
39See, e.g., Laura Miller, Election by Lottery: Ballot Order,
Equal Protection, and the Irrational Voter, 13 N.Y.U. J.
Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 373, 380–81 (2010).
40E.g.,Norden et al., supra note 12, at 24–27 (noting that a Sar-
asota County ballot violated good design principles by putting
two contests on the same computer screen, probably leading
more than 13% of voters to skip a two-candidate congressional
contest, which was located at the top of the same screen as a
gubernatorial contest that listed 12 candidates for governor and
lieutenant-governor and took up the vast majority of the screen).
41E.g., Heather K. Gerken, Shortcuts to Reform, 93 Minn. L.
Rev. 1582, 1585 (2009) (‘‘Many of the local officials who
run our elections have strong partisan ties. While bias is the
most disturbing consequence of partisanship, it’s not the most
common. Perhaps the most unfortunate byproduct of partisan-
ship is a lack of professionalism. A system that depends on
the political parties to staff it is unlikely to be staffed with
trained experts.’’).
42Jason M. Roberts, The Effect of Ballot Type on Congres-
sional Elections, 1946–2006 13 (paper prepared for delivery
at the 2008 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science
Association), available at < http://www.unc.edu/*jmr08/
UNC/Working_Papers_files/ballot_type.pdf > (hereinafter
‘‘Roberts I’’) (Fig. 3, ‘‘Ballot Type by Year, 1946–2006’’).
For 1946, the chart in Fig. 3 shows party column ballots in
use in approximately 235 U.S. House Districts, with office
block ballots in use in approximately 180 U.S. House Dis-
tricts. By 2006, things had switched, and the chart shows
nearly 250 House Districts using office block ballots, and
less than 150 using the party column ballot. See also Jason
M. Roberts, Bicameralism, Ballot Type, and Split-Ticket Vot-
ing 14 (2009), available at < http://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/
archived/Bicameralism%20papers/jason%20roberts.pdf> (here-
inafter ‘‘Roberts II’’) (Fig. 4, ‘‘Ballot Type by Year, 1888–
2008’’). Fig. 4 is a chart showing changes in slate ballots v.
office block ballots, showing more states using slate ballots
from approximately 1900 to 1975.
43A sample slate ballot for Hunterdon County, New Jersey,
for the 2009 General Election, is available at < http://www
.co.hunterdon.nj.us/election/2009general/SampleBallots/
GlenGardner.pdf > .
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for each candidate listed on the slate.44 Slate ballots
make rotation difficult, although at least one state
does use rotation with a slate ballot, rotating slates
rather than candidates.45
More states now use the ‘‘office block’’ style of bal-
lot, in which the primary organizing principle is the set
of contested offices rather than the set of political par-
ties.46 Office block ballots are amenable to rotation in
a way that slate ballots are not, because the names of
the candidates for each office can easily be rotated
independently of the names for another office. Fortu-
nately, over the past 30 years or so, many states have
moved from slate ballots to office block ballots.47
Accordingly, now may be a particularly good time
to implement ballot rotation on a wider scale.
B. Current state laws governing order of candidate
names on ballots
State, rather than federal, officials usually
decide whether to use ballots that are slate or
office block, fixed-position or rotated.48 State
ballot ordering laws remind one of Tolstoy’s
unhappy families;49 each state seems to order its
ballots in its own way, although there are a
few patterns worth noting. On fixed-position bal-
lots, some states will assign the top position on
the basis of popularity, perhaps to the party
that received the most votes in a particular con-
test (often governor) in a previous election.50
In other states, the top two positions are given
to the top two parties, and then places on a sec-
ond tier, if needed, are given to less popular
parties using various methods.51 Other states
use some random method of choosing among
all candidates for the order on a fixed-position
ballot.52
States implement ballot rotation in several
different ways as well. Some states use precinct-
level rotation or some other ‘‘micro-rotation
system’’; others use ‘‘macro-rotation systems,’’
44Roberts I, supra note 42, at 9 (noting that ‘‘the party col-
umn ballot organizes the ballot by party and thus encourages
voters to weight party identification more heavily in their
decision calculus thus producing less ballot roll-off’’).
Admittedly, straight-ticket ballots can cause other problems,
particularly so-called ‘‘straight-ticket vote with exception’’
ballots. See text accompanying note 117; see also Herrn-
son et al., supra note 18, at 78–80; Niemi and Herrnson,
supra note 13, at 320–21 (describing the often complex
and confusing instructions that accompany straight-party
ballots).
45E.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. x 656:5 (‘‘The names of all can-
didates nominated in accordance with the election laws shall be
arranged upon the state general election ballot in successive
party columns. The position of party columns shall be rotated
on the ballots used so that each party column shall appear
thereon, to the extent practicable, an approximately equal num-
ber of times in the first, last, and each intermediate column
position across the state, without requiring more than one
unique column order or ballot format for each town, ward, or
unincorporated place.’’).
46See, e.g., Herrnson et al., supra note 18, at 33. A sample
of an office block style ballot, for the November 2012 General
Election in King County, Washington, is available here:
< http://your.kingcounty.gov/elections/2012nov-general/docs/
leg1sample.pdf > .
47Roberts II, supra note 42, at 14 (Fig. 4, ‘‘Ballot Type by Year,
1888–2008,’’ showing office block ballots in use in approxima-
tely 45 states, with party column ballots in use in approximately
five states).
48E.g., Nathaniel Persily, ‘‘Celebrating’’ the Tenth Anniver-
sary of the 2000 Election Controversy: What the World Can
Learn from the Recent History of Election Dysfunction in
the United States, 44 Indiana L. Rev. 85, 85–86 (2010)
(‘‘Most decisions concerning election administration are
made at the local, usually county, level. Localities are most
often in charge of decisions concerning ballot design and
technology, as well as those dealing with polling place alloca-
tion and administration. The result is a patchwork quilt where
the quality of democracy often varies according to the fortuity
as to where one lives.’’) (footnotes omitted).
49Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina (‘‘Happy families are all
alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.’’).
50Maryland law assigns the first row or column on the ballot to
‘‘the majority party,’’ which it defines by the number of people
registered with the party. Other parties follow in order of pop-
ularity. Md. Election Law Code Ann. x 9-210. Arizona
law assigns positions based on the votes cast in the most recent
gubernatorial election. Ariz. Rev. Stat. x 16-502(E).
Although incumbent-first statutes have been found unconstitu-
tional (e.g., Gould v. Grubb, 536 P.2d 1337, 1339 (Cal. 1975);
McClain v. Meier, 637 F.2d 1159, 1167 (8th Cir. 1980)), incum-
bent-first ballots are still in use in Massachusetts, which uses
office block ballots and heads each contest list with the
name(s) of any incumbent(s), designated as such. Candidates
of ‘‘political parties’’ (as defined in state law) follow in alpha-
betical order, with candidates who are not of political parties
following those, also in alphabetical order. Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 54, xx 41A, 42.
51E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. x 1-5-404. Colorado actually creates
three tiers of candidates. The first tier contains the ‘‘names of
the candidates of the major political parties.in an order
established by lot’’; the second tier contains the names of
the candidates of ‘‘the minor political parties,’’ also in an
order established by lot; the third tier contains the candidates
of the ‘‘remaining political organizations,’’ again, ordered by
lot.
52E.g., Oregon Rev. Stat. x 254.155 (after the identification
of a random alphabet, ‘‘[t]he county clerk shall arrange by sur-
name the names of the candidates on the ballot in the random
order of the letters of the alphabet completed by the Secretary
of State under subsection (1) of this section.’’).
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rotating across larger units such as assembly dis-
tricts.53 Some states implement rotation in their pri-
mary elections but use fixed-position ballots in the
general election.54 Interestingly, voters in New
York State primaries use fixed-position ballots out-
side New York City, but the law mandates rotation
on primary ballots in New York City.55
Only a few states use micro-rotation, or rota-
tion by small electoral units. Professor Jon Kros-
nick, who has done significant work on political
and psychological issues in voting and survey
design, argues (with others) that micro-rotation is
the best method, and that states should rotate candi-
date names ‘‘by precinct or more frequently.’’56 This
method is most effective because even local contests
take place over a large number of precincts, and
thus precinct-level rotation has a good chance to
distribute more fairly the benefits and burdens of
each position in the contest. Perhaps obviously,
the greater the number of precincts a contest
includes, the more effectively precinct-level rota-
tion can mitigate the impact of position-influenced
votes. States that use precinct-level rotation or
better—in at least some elections—include Ohio,
Montana, North Dakota, and Idaho.57
Legislators show by their behavior—both in the
laws that they enact and the way that they run for
office—that they believe in the existence of at
least one kind of position-influenced vote: primacy-
effect votes. Many state legislatures have passed
laws ensuring that the top spot on the ticket is
reserved for one of the two major parties.58 In Aus-
tralia, when candidate names were organized in
alphabetical order, political parties began to show
53E.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. x 3505.03 mandates that
‘‘[t]he names of all candidates for an office shall be arranged
in a group under the title of that office, and, except for absen-
tee ballots or when the number of candidates for a particular
office is the same as the number of candidates to be elected
for that office, shall be rotated from one precinct to another.’’
California, in contrast, uses a randomized alphabet, but it
implements a ‘‘macro-rotation’’ system that rotates names
by Assembly district. See Cal. Elec. Code x 13111 (‘‘In
the case of all other offices, the candidates for which are to
be voted on throughout the state, the Secretary of State shall
arrange the names of the candidates for the office in accor-
dance with the randomized alphabet as provided for in Section
13112 for the First Assembly District. Thereafter, for each
succeeding Assembly district, the name appearing first in
the last preceding Assembly district shall be placed last, the
order of the other names remaining unchanged. If the office
is to be voted upon wholly within, but not throughout, one
county, as in the case of municipal, district, county supervisor,
and county central committee offices, the official responsible
for conducting the election shall determine the order of names
in accordance with the randomized alphabet as provided for in
Section 13112.’’). California’s system may mitigate electoral
impact for statewide candidates, but state law does not require
rotation for candidates whose jurisdiction is entirely within an
assembly district.
54Ariz. Rev. Stat. x 16-464 (indicating rotation for primary
elections: ‘‘[T]he names of all candidates for the nomination
shall be so alternated upon the ballots used in each election pre-
cinct that the name of each candidate shall appear substantially
an equal number of times at the top, at the bottom and in each
intermediate place of the list or group of candidates in which
they belong. In elections in which paper ballots are used,
the ballots shall be printed and bound so that every ballot in
the bound blocks shall have the names in a different and alter-
nating position from the preceding ballot.’’); Ariz. Rev. Stat.
x 16-502 (indicating fixed position slate ballots for general elec-
tion: ‘‘The lists of the candidates of the several parties shall be
arranged with the names of the parties in descending order
according to the votes cast for governor for that county in the
most recent general election for the office of governor, com-
mencing with the left-hand column.’’).
55McKinney’s Election Law x 7-116(6) (providing that rota-
tion is to be implemented as an ‘‘additional provision’’ in pri-
mary elections in New York City); see also Koppell v. New
York State Bd. of Elections, 108 F. Supp. 2d 355, 360
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding constitutional a primary ballot system
that mandates a lottery in the 57 counties outside of New York
and rotation within the city of New York).
56Krosnick et al., supra note 22, at 51–74. Of course, rotation
mitigates harm caused by position-influenced votes, but does
not prevent it entirely. If a candidate appears in a disfavored
position in a precinct that contains mostly supporters of that
candidate, the candidate will lose more votes than if the candi-
date appears in a disfavored position in a precinct in which the
candidate has few supporters. As long as the rotation pattern is
random, however, any unevenness will likely be equalized.
57E.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. x 3505.03 (office type ballot
indicating rotation by precinct); Idaho Code x 34-903
(2011) (indicating secretary of state will designate rotation
method). See also Krosnick et al., supra note 22, at 53.
58E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. x 1-5-404 (sorting candidates into
three tiers, with the first tier reserved for ‘‘the two major polit-
ical parties,’’ in an order established by lot).
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a marked preference for candidates whose surnames
were in the first third of the alphabet.59
In a well-known incident in Illinois, candidates
who were told that their position on the ballot
would depend on when they filed their petitions
for candidacy decided to camp out overnight at
the office of the Secretary of State to try to get
that coveted first position.60 Plaintiffs challenged
the ballot-ordering decisions of the Illinois Secre-
tary of State, who admitted in testimony that he
gave the top position purposefully, in part by arrang-
ing a special mail drop for preferred candidates.61 In
its decision, the Seventh Circuit referred to the tes-
timony of expert witnesses as to benefits of the top
position, then commented on the silent but much
louder testimony of the politicians’ behavior:
The Secretary of State, those candidates who
went to some trouble to have their petitions
in the weekend mail at Springfield, and the
substantial number of candidates or represen-
tatives who spent a wakeful Sunday night in
the capitol corridors have all attested by their
actions that there is an advantage in being
first on the ballot.62
As others have noted, state laws governing ballot
design seem to operate based on the assumption
that primacy effect exists, and that it changes the
outcome of elections.63 Indeed, even if the impact
of primacy-effect votes were a fallacy, imple-
menting rotation might be worthwhile simply
because it would increase the appearance of elec-
toral integrity.64
Some may argue that position-influenced votes
are not a significant enough problem to require a
solution. Many studies show that primacy-effect
votes, for example, make less of a difference in
partisan and top of the ticket contests and have
the biggest impact in non-partisan and bottom
of the ticket contests.65 These seemingly less-
significant contests, however, create elected offi-
cials who develop name recognition and political
clout that make them more attractive top-ticket
candidates in later years. Just as small differences
in vote totals can make a big difference in election
results, winning small contests in one election can
affect the result of a big contest in a later elec-
tion.66 Further, as Meredith and Salant noted in
their 2007 study of council and school board elec-
tions, ‘‘a good deal of local governmental policies’’
59Amy King and Andrew Leigh, Are Ballot Order Effects Het-
erogeneous? 90 Soc. Sci. Q, 71, 73 (Mar. 2009) (‘‘Mackerras
(1970) has shown that due to firm belief in the power of the
‘donkey vote’ and a desire to maximize their candidates’ chan-
ces of being placed high in the ballot order, political parties
actively chose candidates with surnames early in the alphabet
(see also Orr, 2002). Using data from the 1974, 1977, and
1980 Australian federal elections and the 1974 British general
election, Kelley and McAllister (1984) estimated that having
a surname in the first third of the alphabet was worth an addi-
tional 1.3 percentage points for Australian candidates, but had
no effect on candidates in the British election. They conclude
that one possible explanation for this difference may be the
fact that voting is compulsory in Australia but not in Britain.’’)
At least partly in response to concerns about primacy-effect
votes, the practice of alphabetical ordering was abandoned in
1984. Id.
60Weisberg v. Powell, 417 F.2d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1969). In Cal-
ifornia, where the top of the ballot is awarded based on a special
drawing that creates a new ‘‘alphabetical order,’’ the board of
elections issues a press release when the drawing occurs,
which may give added emphasis to the lottery winners and
added name recognition. John Maurelius, The Skirmishing
Begins; Campaign’s Opening Salvos Unleashed on TV Talk
Shows, San Diego Union-Trib. (Aug. 11, 2003) (discussing
lottery drawing for California gubernatorial recall election
and noting that ‘‘[w]ith more than 193 candidates running.po-
sition on the ballot is crucial’’).
61Weisberg v. Powell, 417 F.2d at 390. When faced with inev-
itable ties in time of filing, the Secretary of State chose which
candidates would receive the coveted top spot. Id.
62Id. at 393.
63Ho and Imai, supra note 22, at 219 (‘‘Dozens of [U.S.]
court decisions and the drafting of electoral statutes in all
50 states rely on a version of the claim that vote shares
will accrue to a candidate solely for being listed first on
the ballot. And electoral jurisdictions have proposed reme-
dying ballot order effects by instituting some form of rota-
tion or randomization. At the heart of these reform efforts
is an assumption of ballot order effects.’’) (footnotes
omitted).
64E.g., Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181,
190–191 (2008) (noting the importance of state interests in the
‘‘integrity’’ of the voting process and of safeguarding ‘‘voter
confidence’’).
65E.g., Augenblick and Nicholson, supra note 12, at 23 (‘‘We
find that voters are more likely to abstain and more likely to
rely on decision shortcuts, such as voting for the status quo or
the first candidate listed in a contest, as the ballot position of
a contest falls.’’).
66E.g., Meredith and Salant, supra note 26, at 24 (‘‘In particular,
the current use of alphabetical ordering for local elections in
many states not only provides the same candidates with the
advantage of ballot position in election after election, but also
gives the beneficiaries of ballot positioning the subsequent
advantage of incumbency.’’).
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are set by ‘‘the large number of city council and
school board elections nationwide.’’67 Thus, rota-
tion is important not only because it may have an
impact in close high-profile contests, but also
because it may promote fair results in down-ticket
contests, contests whose results have a large
impact on the governments—and the governing—
of the communities we live in.
III. HOW BALLOT POSITION AFFECTS
VOTERS AND VOTING
Ballot order and ballot design can have an
impact on who voters decide to vote for or how
accurately they cast their ballots, and thus, an
impact on who they actually vote for. As noted
above, these position-influenced votes fall into
three categories: (A) primacy-effect votes, (B)
proximity-mistake votes, and (C) ballot-flaw-in-
duced votes.
The existence of position-influenced votes is
not surprising. As the author of Design for
Democracy has noted, ‘‘[m]any ballot design
problems derive from the simple fact that U.S.
elections are complicated. The tendency of our
political system to put many candidates and issues
before the electorate can create a burden for voters
and election administrators.’’68 For example, in
the 2012 general election, voters in a precinct in
Franklin County, Ohio faced a ballot containing
31 contests.69 Further, many voters are only
marginally familiar with the equipment on
which they vote. Even diligent voters typically
cast ballots no more than twice per year, which
hardly provides an opportunity to become an
expert on a particular piece of voting technol-
ogy. The fact that each county may use a differ-
ent type of voting technology means that even
moving a short distance could result in having
to become acquainted with a new voting system.70
It is therefore not unremarkable that voters would
make mistakes when voting, and that some might
use time-saving methods—consciously or uncon-
sciously—to help them vote more quickly.71
Indeed, both state election laws and court deci-
sions have acknowledged the peculiar vulnerabil-
ities of voters on Election Day.72
In lawsuits claiming that primacy-effect votes cre-
ate a constitutional problem, some courts have
67Id. at 3, 24 (concluding that ‘‘[i]n more than five percent of
the California city council and school board elections in our
dataset, the candidate listed first on the ballot won office as
a result of the ballot ordering,’’ and observing that ‘‘[g]iven
the large number of city council and school board elections
nationwide which do not use rotated or randomized ballots,
a good deal of local governmental policies are likely being
set by individuals elected only because of their ballot posi-
tion’’).
68Lausen, supra note 28, at 15.
69Precinct 60-F in Franklin County (copy of ballot on file with
the author), available at < http://vote.franklincountyohio.gov/
voter/ballots/SAMPLE_0385.pdf> ; see also Niemi and Herrn-
son, supra note 13, at 325 (observing the number of constraints
that United States election systems have as compared to
‘‘smaller, unified systems’’).
70Based on census data from 2000 to 2006, the Brennan Center
reported that more than 29 million people of voting age move
each year, indicating that they will likely face a voting system
different from the one they had used previously. Norden
et al., supra note 12, at 10.
71E.g., Miller, supra note 39, at 381–85 (discussing how voters
use cues and heuristics to save time and energy when making
voting decisions) (citations omitted).
72It is common for states to have laws that restrict campaigning
within a certain zone around the polling places; some may even
restrict the wearing of t-shirts, buttons, and the like. E.g., Gar-
ionis v. Newton, 827 F.2d 306, 309 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding that
an officer acted reasonably when he arrested a voter under an
anti-electioneering statute when the voter refused to remove a
political button at the polling place). See also Cobb v. Thurman,
957 So. 2d 638 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006). In Cobb, the court ana-
lyzed how best to provide information for voters when the
Republican candidate on the ballot (Foley) had withdrawn
from the contest. The Republican Party had substituted Negron,
and votes cast for Foley would be counted for Negron. The
court analyzed a state statute requiring ‘‘neutrality’’ and
rejected as invalid a notice that advised ‘‘that any vote cast
for Foley would be counted as a vote for Negron,’’ observing
that the notice ‘‘made no mention of the other two candidates
on the ballot.’’ Id. at 640. The court found that this notice
‘‘may suggest favoritism on behalf of the Republican candidate
[because] these are the last names a voter will see prior to going
into the voting booth. The mention of the Republican candidate
to the exclusion of the Democrat or the independent candidates
may be considered to be an implied endorsement.’’ Id. at 646.
The court found acceptable a notice that mentioned the
names of all three candidates. Id. at 640.
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described voters influenced by primacy effect as ‘‘irra-
tional’’73 or ‘‘uninformed.’’74 But there’s a better way
to describe these voters: they are human. Indeed,
information design and usability scholars who talk
about the way people interact with visual informa-
tion—and about the way they make predictable mis-
takes during these interactions—use the term
‘‘human factors’’75 to describe the issues they study.
Information designers use human factors research to
promote ‘‘[u]ser-centered design, or human-centered
design,’’ which ‘‘places the end user at the center of
the design process.’’76 Thus, ‘‘information design
focuses on the accurate representation of specific
knowledge sets and the unique needs of the end user
receiving that content.’’77 Their goal is ‘‘to create arti-
facts that enhance the way people work, learn, and
play—rather than forcing them to conform to new
or unfamiliar skill sets and learning methods.’’78
Human factors researchers seek to increase the degree
to which ‘‘individuals find it easy and satisfying to use
systems and to perform the expected tasks accurately
and within a reasonable amount of time.’’79 Accord-
ingly, those arguing in favor of rotational schemes
would do well to go beyond arguments based on pri-
macy effect voting and argue that rotation is necessary
because of the human factors-type research that shows
that both well designed and badly designed ballots can
predictably lead to certain voter behaviors.
The science of behavioral economics also
offers new justifications for changing ballot order-
ing laws. Behavioral economics makes clear how
predictably human behavior is influenced by seem-
ingly innocuous stimuli. In 2008, two books were
published—Nudge, by Sunstein and Thaler, and
Predictably Irrational, by Ariely—that explain
behavioral economics to non-academic audiences.80
These books discount the theory that human beings
are perfectly rational actors – called ‘‘Econs’’ in
Sunstein and Thaler’s work. Econs consider all of
their choices carefully and always act in their own
best interests. Instead, Sunstein and Thaler note,
we are not Econs but ‘‘Humans’’: imperfect crea-
tures who often act for irrational reasons and can
often be led to make certain choices by avoidable
or unavoidable ‘‘nudges.’’ These nudges are built
into the choice mechanisms that are the inevitable
part of any decision we must make.81 Even though
nudges do not force us to make certain choices,
they lead, or ‘‘nudge’’ us to make certain choices
in ways that we must expend energy to resist.
Because resisting nudges may impose costs in
time, cognitive energy, and reputation that not
every chooser is willing to expend, nudges can
have a significant impact on the choices we make.82
Some aspects of election law seem to presume
that voters are what I will call ‘‘Votons.’’ Like
73E.g., New Alliance Party v. New York State Bd. of Elections,
861 F. Supp. 282, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding constitutional
state election law that used separate methods to determine bal-
lot contest location of established political parties as opposed to
independent parties and noting that ‘‘an irrational vote is just as
much of a vote as a rational one’’) (citation omitted); see also
Miller, supra note 39, at 380–89 (discussing primacy effect
and its impact on voter behavior in an article whose title refers
to ‘‘the Irrational Voter’’).
74E.g., Sonneman v. State, 969 P.2d at 640–41 (upholding Alas-
ka’s fixed-position ballot statute and noting that ‘‘the concept of
the people’s will encompasses all who vote, those who are care-
less and uninformed as well as those who are more thoughtful
and knowledgeable’’).
75The field of ‘‘human factors’’ has been described as ‘‘that field
which is involved in conducting research regarding human psy-
chological, social, physical, and biological characteristics,
maintaining the information obtained from that research, and
working to apply that information with respect to the design,
operation, or use of products or systems for optimizing
human performance, health, safety, and/or habitability.’’
James H. Stramler, The Dictionary for Human Fac-
tors/Ergonomics (Boca Raton, LA: CRC Press, 1993)
(cited at the website for the Human Factors and Ergonomic
Society, available at < http://www.hfes.org/Web/Educational-
Resources/HFEdefinitionsmain.html > ).
76Jenn Visocky O’Grady and Ken Visocky O’Grady,
The Information Design Handbook 25 (HOW Books
2008).
77Id. at 6.
78Id. at 25.
79Herrnson et al., supra note 18, at 3 (citation omitted).
80Thaler and Sunstein, supra note 7; Dan Ariely, Pre-
dictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape
Our Decisions (Harper 2008).
81Thaler and Sunstein, supra note 7, at 3 (‘‘A choice archi-
tect has the responsibility for organizing the context in which
people make decisions. [M]any.people turn out to be
choice architects, most without realizing it. If you design
the ballot voters use to choose candidates, you are a choice
architect. A good rule of thumb is to assume that ‘everything
matters.’ In many cases, the power of these small details
comes from focusing the attention of users in a particular
direction.’’).
82See Ariely, supra note 80, at 241, 237 (observing that
‘‘[b]ehavior economists, on the other hand, believe that people
are susceptible to irrelevant influences from their immediate
environment (which we call context effects), irrelevant emo-
tions, shortsightedness, and other forms of irrationality,’’ and
that ‘‘[i]n essence, people, particularly those with a high need
for uniqueness, may sacrifice personal utility in order to gain
reputational utility’’).
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Econs, Votons always act with perfect thoughtful-
ness, rationality, and execution. Votons arrive at
the polls on Election Day having already decided
exactly who to vote for, and whether they are
going to vote in every contest. Votons interact
with the ballot only to execute their perfectly
formed decisions, and they are unlikely to be influ-
enced by the way the ballot is designed. Further, if
they are confused by the ballot or believe they
have made a mistake, Votons, who are never embar-
rassed, will always ask the poll workers for help.
Votons also have unlimited time and equal inter-
est in all of the contests, so if a Voton makes a
mistake—in any contest from President to County
Coroner—it’s no trouble to spend a minute or two
to correct it.
Unfortunately, Votons have very low turnout on
Election Day; Humans are much more likely to
show up at the polls. While some Humans arrive
at the polls with a list of candidates for whom
they intend to vote, not all of them do, and some
may have only an incomplete list. Further, Humans
do not have unlimited time and unlimited devotion
to all of the contests on the ballot, and they get
embarrassed—i.e., they worry about expending rep-
utation costs—if they make a mistake and are uncer-
tain about how to fix it.
Humans may cast ballot-flaw-induced votes, as
many did when voting on the infamous butterfly
ballot that gained notoriety in the 2000 election.
But position-influenced votes are even more likely
to result from an unavoidable reality of using a bal-
lot: some names or choices are going to take less
time to find, or be easier to vote for accurately,
and other names or choices are going to be harder
to find, or take more time to vote for accurately.
If Howard Human decides to vote in a contest
that he does not know or care much about, he may
be influenced by primacy effect—that is, he may
be a little more likely to decide to vote for the
first choice listed, because it is easier or for a variety
of reasons.83 On the other hand, even in a contest
that he knows and cares about, he may have a prob-
lem if his candidate’s name is in the middle of a long
(or even a short) list. In that situation, Howard may
cast a proximity-mistake vote: he may punch the
button of the candidate whose name is just above
or just below the name that he intended to vote
for.84 If Howard is voting on a badly designed bal-
lot, the ballot may lead him to cast a ballot-flaw-
induced vote.85 And even if Howard is made
aware of that mistake, he may be unlikely to correct
it in certain circumstances. For example, if that con-
test is less important to him, he is going to be less
likely to spend the time costs (or if needed, the cog-
nitive or reputation costs) to fix the mistake.86
Rotation can mitigate the electoral impact of all
three kinds of position-influenced votes. Notably,
giving Human voters the opportunity to correct
ballot mistakes—while an important reform—is
not sufficient to counteract the impact of position-
influenced votes.
A. Primacy-effect votes
A ‘‘primacy-effect vote’’ results when a voter is
influenced to decide to cast a vote for a particular
candidate—usually the first candidate listed—by
that candidate’s position on the ballot. A common
scenario for a primacy-effect vote occurs when a
voter who has low information about a contest
(or about the candidates in a contest) decides to
vote in that contest. For example, when Helen
Human entered the voting booth on a recent Elec-
tion Day, she had not thought much about the con-
test for the position of Clerk of Courts. Helen saw
that the first name on the list of choices was that of
Melissa Jackson. She recognized the name, and
she had some positive association with it because
of television advertising and because of some
campaign literature she had received in the park-
ing lot of the polling location. Accordingly,
Helen selected Melissa Jackson without even
83E.g., David Brockington, A Low Information Theory of Ballot
Position Effect, 25 Pol. Behav. 1, 4–5 (2003); see also Her-
bert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of
Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organi-
zation 118–20 (Free Press 4th ed. 1997).
84Luttmer and Shue, supra note 23, at 16, 28 (noting that in Cal-
ifornia recall election study, the results also showed differences
based on technology, indicating that ‘‘0.197% of voters using
punch card technology misvote for each adjacent candidate
compared to only 0.100% and 0.065% of voters using optical
scan and touch screen technology respectively.’’).
85E.g., Wand et al., supra note 13, at 803 (conducting intensive
study ballots in Palm Beach County and concluding that ‘‘the
butterfly ballot caused systematic voting errors in [Palm
Beach County]’’).
86Herrnson et al., supra note 18, at 77. The authors found
that accuracy rates drop 5–12 percentage points when voters
change a vote, noting that on various systems, some voters
were ‘‘unwilling or unable’’ to make the change, or did not
make the change ‘‘[i]n response to the extra work involved.’’
See also note 157 infra, and accompanying text.
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looking at the names of the other candidates for
that office.
Studies going back decades draw conclusions
about the impact of ballot position on voter
decision-making.87 The main focus of most of
these studies is the impact of primacy effect, i.e.,
the biasing effect of the first position on the ballot.88
Although most agree that primacy effect is signifi-
cant in non-partisan contests, some have found
less impact in partisan contests.89 In recent years,
some have questioned primacy effect impact as a
whole, wondering whether the impact is significant
enough to require court-ordered ‘‘cures.’’90 In con-
trast, others have gone beyond primacy effect,
studying the impact not only of fixed-position bal-
lots but of fixed-order ballots or of fixed contest
orders on those ballots.91
Information design experts and political scien-
tists believe that primacy-effect votes can have a
significant impact on some elections. Krosnick
et al. believe that primacy effect may contribute
3–5% of the total to the first-listed candidate.92
Brockington argues that primacy effect can give a
first-listed candidate a bump of .7% to 5.2%.93 Ho
and Imai conclude that in general elections, ballot
order ‘‘substantially’’ affects minor parties but has
‘‘inconclusive’’ effects on major candidates.94 In
primaries, however, they conclude that ‘‘being listed
first significantly increases vote shares for all candi-
dates,’’ noting that ‘‘ballot order might have
changed the winner in as many as 12 percent of
all primary contests [that the authors] examined.’’95
Koppell and Steen found that the votes ‘‘added’’ by
primacy effect were enough to change the outcome
of the election in 7 of the 79 contests they studied.96
In a 2007 study that focused on more than 5,000
local, multi-selection contests such as city council
and school board elections, Meredith and Salant
concluded that in over 5% of the elections, the can-
didate listed first won the contest ‘‘as a result of bal-
lot position.’’97
Primacy effect may have both psychological
and physical causes. First, when we need to
make decisions in certain contexts, we may resort
to a time-saving strategy that social scientists call
‘‘satisficing.’’98 Voters who ‘‘satisfice’’ select the
first satisfactory candidate on the list and then
move on. Particularly when the stakes are
lower—i.e., when they do not see that the results
of their choice will affect them significantly—
they may decide not to look at the whole list.
Instead, they will look at the first choice and ask,
in essence, ‘‘Is this choice good enough, or do I
have to spend more time and energy and go on to
the next choice on the list?’’ Some psychologists
describe satisficing voters as having a ‘‘confirma-
tory bias’’: they look at the first name on the list
87E.g., Henry M. Bain, Jr. and Donald S. Hecock, Bal-
lot Position and Voter’s Choice: The Arrangement of
Names on the Ballot and Its Effect on the Voter 85
(Wayne State University Press 1957) (‘‘We found statistically
significant evidence of position effect in primary and non-par-
tisan elections in several Michigan cities.’’).
88E.g., Miller and Krosnick, supra note 8, at 293–94 (‘‘One psy-
chological theory of order effects predicts ‘primacy effects,’
which are biases toward selecting the first object considered
in a set.’’) (citations omitted); Augenblick and Nicholson,
supra note 12, at 23 (‘‘We find that voters are more likely to
abstain and more likely to rely on decision shortcuts, such as
voting for the status quo or the first candidate listed in a contest,
as the ballot position of a contest falls’’); Koppell and Steen,
supra note 17, at 269.
89E.g., Ho and Imai, supra note 22, at 230, 236 (finding a pri-
macy effect between 1% and 2% in primary contests, but no pri-
macy effect for major candidates in general elections).
90R. Michael Alvarez, Betsy Sinclair, and Richard L. Hasen,
How Much Is Enough? The ‘‘Ballot Order Effect’’ and the
Use of Social Science Research in Election Law Disputes, 5
Elect. L. J. 40, 53 (2006) (criticizing methodology of some
ballot-order studies and arguing that courts should not overturn
elections based on social-science research and should not order
rotation due to costs and possible ‘‘voter confusion’’); but see
Elizabeth Garrett, Democracy in the Wake of the California
Recall, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 239, 257 (2004) (noting the lack
of voter confusion in the California recall election (with 135
candidates) and observing that ‘‘the recall experience suggests
that most voters are able to cope with some complexity in bal-
lots’’). Garrett did not mention evidence of any confusion in the
recall caused by California’s rotation system.
91Meredith and Salant, supra note 26, at 3 (concluding that vot-
ers who must select more than one candidate in a contest (e.g.,
in a city council contest) may be less likely to vote for a candi-
date whose name is positioned immediately after that of a very
popular candidate); Augenblick and Nicholson, supra note 12,
at 23 (‘‘We find that voters are more likely to abstain and more
likely to rely on decision shortcuts, such as voting for the status
quo or the first candidate listed in a contest, as the ballot posi-
tion of a contest falls.’’).
92Krosnick et al., supra note 22, at 66 (results of a study of the
2000 elections in Ohio and North Dakota and reporting primacy
effects in two-candidate contests that ranged from 1.41% to
6.32%, with an average of 2.88%).
93Brockington, supra note 83, at 5.
94Ho and Imai, supra note 22, at 218.
95Id.
96Koppell and Steen, supra note 17, at 267–81.
97Meredith and Salant, supra note 26, at 15.
98Brockington, supra note 83, at 4–5; see also Simon, supra
note 83, at 118–20.
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and try to find reasons to confirm a decision to vote
for that person.99
In the example above, Helen Human used a sat-
isficing strategy to choose the first candidate listed
for the position of clerk of courts. Perhaps like
many voters, Helen did not believe that the clerk
of courts would be likely to have a huge impact
on her life, and so she was unwilling to expend sig-
nificant cognitive energy in choosing a candidate
in that contest.
But the mere physical realities of name place-
ment can have an impact as well. Consider the
task of choosing one item from a list of three
choices. If Helen Human reads a list of three
names, she may find it difficult to avoid spending
more time thinking about the first name than the
others due simply to the physical reality of encoun-
tering the top-listed name first. She may be asking
herself, ‘‘Do I want A? Do I like A better than B?
Do I like A or B better than C?’’ Even if Helen men-
tally asks herself about each candidate separately
(as in ‘‘Do I want to vote for A? Or do I want to
vote for B? Or do I want to vote for C?’’), she cannot
help but carry at least some mental residue of the
first candidate’s name as she moves on to the
names of the other candidates.100 That extra time
spent thinking about a candidate can translate to
extra votes.
Studies using eye-tracking technology show that
people choosing an item from a list spend more time
looking at the first item than they do looking at later
items.101 Even though this time difference may
be measured in milliseconds, that additional time
may provide a meaningful advantage to the first-
listed candidate. Some studies show that the aver-
age voter spends five minutes or less when vot-
ing.102 Indeed, many state statutes limit time in
the voting booth. Louisiana has a strict limit of
three minutes; in Ohio the limit is five minutes,
but that limit applies only when all voting machines
are in use.103
Consider that an average general election ballot
could ask each voter to execute 30 or more individ-
ual voting decisions. ‘‘Executing’’ a voting decision
includes time spent deciding on the choice (if any),
time spent finding the choice, and time spent actu-
ally pushing the button or filling in the bubble to
cast the vote. A three-minute limit gives a voter
six seconds to execute each choice on a 30-contest
ballot, and even a five-minute limit would allow
only ten seconds to execute each choice. If each
candidate whose name appears at the top of the
list gets even one extra second of the voter’s ‘‘eye
time,’’ just the extra time looking at those first can-
didates could use up 30 seconds, or 10% of the time
the average voter spends voting. Thus, the top-listed
candidate gets a tangible bonus by being on the vot-
er’s radar both sooner and longer. That extra time
can predictably result in extra votes.104
99Miller and Krosnick, supra note 8, at 293–94 (‘‘Specifically,
people usually begin a search of memory for information about
an object by looking for reasons to select answer choices rather
than reasons not to select them.’’) (citation omitted).
100See Miller and Krosnick, supra note 8, at 294 (‘‘When work-
ing through a list, people think less and less about each subse-
quent alternative, because they become increasingly fatigued[,]
and short-term memory becomes increasingly clogged with
thoughts.’’). See also Ho and Imai, supra note 22, at 220 (noting
that under some behavioral analytical models, ‘‘a voter will
choose a candidate without reading the remainder of the ballot
if the perceived marginal benefit of subsequent candidates, dis-
counted by the probability of the pivotal vote, exceeds the cogni-
tive cost of processing the merits of an additional candidate’’)
(citations omitted).
101Mirta Galesic, Roger Tourangeau, Mick P. Couper, and Fred-
erick G. Conrad, Eye-Tracking Data: New Insights on Response
Order Effects and Other Cognitive Shortcuts in Survey
Responding, 72 Pub. Opinion Q. 892 (2008).
102E.g., William A. Edelstein and Arthur D. Edelstein, Queuing
and Elections: Long Lines, DREs and Paper Ballots, Proceedings
of the 2010 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop on
Trustworthy Elections, available at <http://www.usenix.org/
event/evtwote10/tech/full_papers/Edelstein.pdf> (assuming an
average voting time of five minutes); see also Dwayne G. Norris
and Christine A. Paulsen, New York State Voter System User
Rate Assessment Study, Research Report, American Institutes
for Research, at 22, Exhibit 6 (Dec. 11, 2006), available at
<http://www.elections.ny.gov/NYSBOE/hava/DRAFTAIRSTUDY
.pdf> (showing approximately 3–5 minute mean voting time for
voters without an identified disability).
103La. Rev. Stat. x 18:563 (‘‘Avoter shall not remain in a vot-
ing machine longer than three minutes. If a voter fails to leave a
voting machine promptly after a commissioner has notified him
that three minutes have elapsed, the commissioners shall have
the voter removed from the voting machine.’’); Ohio Rev.
Code x 3505.23 (‘‘No voter shall be allowed to occupy a voting
compartment or use a voting machine more than five minutes
when all the voting compartments or machines are in use and
voters are waiting to occupy them.’’).
104The likelihood of casting a primacy-effect vote may increase
as the voter moves down the ballot. Scholars have theorized that
this effect occurs in part because the ‘‘down-ticket’’ contests are
less important to voters, and that voters who care less about a
contest are more likely to ‘‘fall off’’ (i.e., not cast a vote) or,
due to time concerns that increase as they move down the ballot,
they may use a time-saving strategy such as voting for the first
name on the ticket. E.g., Augenblick and Nicholson, supra note
12, at 23. See also Thaler and Sunstein, supra note 7, at 3
(‘‘A good rule of thumb [for a choice architect] is to assume
that ‘everything matters.’ In many cases, the power of these
small details comes from focusing the attention of users in a
particular direction.’’).
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Some believe that fixed-position ballots in a 2010
Senate primary contest may have given a primacy
effect edge to a South Carolina democrat named
Alvin Greene, who was an ‘‘unknown, unemployed,
inarticulate Army veteran who gave no speeches,
distributed no literature, and won no endorse-
ments.’’105 Krosnick theorizes that Hillary Clinton’s
2008 New Hampshire primary victory over Barack
Obama may have resulted from the fixed-position
ballot that put her in the fourth position and
Obama in the 18th position.106
No matter the cause of primacy effect, rotation
can mitigate its impact by giving each candidate
an equal chance to gain the benefits of the top posi-
tion on the ballot. In a state with precinct-level rota-
tion, every candidate would get approximately
equal ‘‘air time’’ in front of voters. To the extent
that familiarity breeds votes, all candidates should
get an equal chance in the voting booth to influence
voters to cast votes for them. Precinct-level ballot
rotation gives candidates that equal chance.
Even with the controversy about the extent of its
impact, primacy effect might on its own provide
sufficient justification for ballot rotation. The two
other categories of position-influenced votes, how-
ever, provide even more justification for making
this change in ballot design universal.
B. Proximity-mistake votes
A second kind of position-influenced vote is
known as the proximity-mistake vote. Unlike
primacy-effect votes, which are accurately cast,
proximity-mistake votes are miscast votes. As dis-
cussed in the next section, some miscast votes are
caused by design flaws. But design flaws are not
the only reason that voters make mistakes. They
make mistakes because they are human, and
humans make mistakes. Unlike residual votes, prox-
imity-mistake votes are more difficult to find when
analyzing election returns because they do not pres-
ent a measurable statistic such as undervotes or
overvotes. Further, voters may not notice pushing
the wrong button or filling in the wrong bubble
while trying to get through 30 or more voting deci-
sions on a crowded ballot.
In this century, voter mistakes have received
more attention. The California gubernatorial recall
of 2003, which included over 100 candidates
for governor, allowed social scientists to gather
some interesting data because it occurred in a
state with macro-rotation.107 Researchers found
that candidates who had few supporters got a bump
in votes when their names appeared adjacent to
the name of one of the three highest vote-getting
candidates.108
In that study, scholars studied votes on ballots
on which the candidates for governor were listed
in multiple columns.109 The authors analyzed
increases in vote share that minor candidates
received when their names were located above
(north), below (south), to the right (east), or to the
left (west) of one of the three so-called ‘‘major’’
candidates.110 They concluded that ‘‘misvoting is
strongest when a minor candidate is east adjacent
[i.e., to the right of a major candidate] and weakest
when a minor candidate is west adjacent [i.e., to the
left of a major candidate]; 0.143% of voters misvote
for east adjacent candidates, only 0.038% of voters
misvote for a west adjacent candidates, while
0.082% and 0.111% of voters misvote for north
105Nick Summers, Can Anyone Explain How Alvin Greene
Actually Won? Ballot Position? Electronic Prompts? Ponder-
ing the Theories Behind an Unlikely Victory, Newsweek
( June 17, 2010), available at < http://www.newsweek.com/
2010/06/17/can-anyone-explain-how-alvin-greene-actually-won
.html> . Greene garnered 59% of the 169,542 votes in the con-
test. Id. But see Joseph Bafumi, Michael C. Herron, Seth J.
Hill, and Jeffrey B. Lewis, Alvin Greene? Who? How Did He
Win the United States Senate Nomination in South Carolina?,
11Election L.J. 358, 368, 377 (2012) (studying the same elec-
tion and concluding that ‘‘Greene benefited slightly’’ by being
listed first, but that ‘‘this effect does not appear to have been
strong enough, at least in our ballot collection, to have secured
Greene’s upset’’).
106Jon A. Krosnick, Ballot Changes Cited in Vote’s Discrep-
ancy with Polls, ABC News, ( Jan. 9, 2008), available at
< http://abcnews.go.com/print?id = 4107883 > (cited in Miller,
supra note 39, at 374).
107California law mandates that candidate names be rotated by
Assembly District; perhaps obviously, using large units such as
assembly districts reduces the benefits that rotation provides.
See Cal. Elec. Code x 13111.
108Luttmer and Shue, supra note 23, at 17.
109Id. (concluding that certain demographic groups were more
likely to misvote, and that proximity (or ‘‘adjacency’’) rather
than name confusion drives misvotes). But the authors included
caveats with their demographic analysis: ‘‘Even if a demo-
graphic characteristic such as low education is correlated with
higher levels of misvoting, lack of education may not be the
cause of adjacency misvotes. For example, it is conceivable
that education is positively correlated with experience taking
standardized exams, and experience with standardized exams
is what truly reduces levels of misvoting.’’ Id. at 21.
110Luttmer and Shue, supra note 23, at 17, 7 (identifying the
three ‘‘major’’ candidates as the three who received the most
votes: Arnold Schwarzenegger (R), Cruz Bustamante (D), and
Tom McClintock (R)).
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and south adjacent candidates respectively.’’111 These
authors conclude that ‘‘misvotes accounted for at
least .25% of all votes cast during the Recall Elec-
tion.’’112 Admitting that ‘‘this difference in lost votes
represents [only] a small fraction of the total vote-
share,’’ the authors nonetheless observe that ‘‘the loss
exceeds the margins of victory in several recent elec-
tions, including the presidential election of 2000 and
the Washington gubernatorial election of 2004. Thus,
adjacency misvoting is powerful enough to determine
the outcomes in highly-contested close elections.’’113
The authors admit that the California gubernato-
rial recall election was an unusual one,114 with a
high number of candidates (135) that is unlikely
to be repeated. Nevertheless, this study makes evi-
dent the number of proximity mistakes that are
not only possible, but probable. The authors recom-
mended future studies to determine ‘‘whether mis-
voting occurs at comparable levels in elections
featuring fewer candidates.’’115
And those studies have begun. In a landmark anal-
ysis of a variety of election systems, Herrnson et al.
conducted a field experiment with 1,540 subjects
and found that 20% of voters made at least one
error.116 Even in the simulated presidential contest,
one to three percent of the ballots (the percentage var-
ied from voting system to voting system), contained a
proximity mistake (‘‘adjacency error’’), that is, a vote
for a candidate just above or below the voter’s
intended candidate in the presidential contest.117 In
a state representative contest, the error rate increased
to over 6% on one of the systems.118
Further, when voters are not voting in the sim-
plest voting situations, their errors increase. The
study showed that voter accuracy declines when
voters must select multiple candidates for the
same office (as in a city council election), when
they try to change a vote after making a selection,
or when they use a ballot with certain ‘‘straight-
party’’ options, especially ballots that allow a
‘‘straight-party vote with exception,’’ which allow
voters to override the straight-party choice for
some contests.119 What’s worse, if these complica-
tions are combined, ‘‘accuracy levels drop still
111Id. at 16. Note that the results also showed differences
based on technology, indicating that ‘‘0.197% of voters
using punch card technology misvote for each adjacent candi-
date compared to only 0.100% and 0.065% of voters using
optical scan and touch screen technology respectively.’’ Id.
at 28.
112Id. at 32.
113Id. at 32. The authors also observe that: ‘‘Numerous presidential,
senatorial, and gubernatorial elections have been determined by
very slim margins of victory. The margins of victory of the popular
vote in the Presidential Elections of 1880, 1884, 1960, and 2000
were all less than one-quarter of a percent.’’ Id. at 29. (citing out-
comes as officially determined by the Electoral College).
114Id. at 30 (acknowledging uniqueness of this election and sug-
gesting future research to determine ‘‘whether misvoting occurs
at comparable levels in elections featuring fewer candidates’’).
115Id.
116See Herrnson et al., supra note 18, at 89 (Study of over
1,500 people in simulated voting situation with a variety of vot-
ing technologies showed that ‘‘roughly 1 in 5 voters made at
least one mistake in casting votes for the seventeen offices for
which only one candidate was to be selected (or in the case of
the presidential election, one team of candidates). Where more
than one candidate was to be elected to a given office, or where
voters changed a vote, many more errors were committed.’’).
117See id. at 82 (‘‘[I]ndividuals voted for the wrong candidate
for president more than 2.5 percent of the time on all but one
system. That is, at the top of the ticket, voting for an unintended
candidate may be a greater problem than overvotes, undervotes,
blank, or uncountable ballots.’’).
118See id. at 74 (table).
119As the authors note, so-called straight-party ballots often
contain complicating features. For example, almost all elections
include some non-partisan contests (e.g., judgeships, issue con-
tests), and some voters don’t realize that they have not cast a
vote in these contests by choosing the straight-party option.
The ‘‘straight-party with exception’’ feature confused about
half of the voters on one of the tested systems. Id. at 78–80.
Herrnson et al. do not detail all of the specific errors that
occur in the straight-party or straight-party-with-exception bal-
lots. Niemi and Herrnson note that straight-party-with-excep-
tion ballot instructions are often confusing or contradictory,
and that a variety of voting problems result from the various
straight-party options, including residual votes (because voters
fail to vote the non-partisan contests) or confusion about how to
override the straight-party options. Niemi and Herrnson, supra
note 13, at 318–21. If bad instructions cause mistaken votes, of
course, rotation could mitigate the problem. Two design adjust-
ments could mitigate the other problems noted. If the problem is
a residual vote—because the voter did not vote the non-partisan
contests after casting the straight party vote—the ballot could
be designed so that voters encountered the issue and non-parti-
san contests on the ballot before they encounter the straight-
ticket decision. See e.g., Sample ballot for the November
2012 General Election in King County, Washington, available
at < http://your.kingcounty.gov/elections/2012nov-general/
docs/leg1sample.pdf> (on a non-straight ticket ballot, showing
issue contests before candidate contests). Voters would then
presumably be more likely to vote in those non-partisan con-
tests. If states want to preserve the ‘‘straight-ticket-with excep-
tion’’ option, the best design option might be an electronic
ballot designed so that punching the straight-ticket button
would populate all of the votes for that party. Voters could
then be instructed to review the ballot and change the votes in
any contests for which they wanted to vote for the candidate
of another party.
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further, dipping into the 80–90% range,’’120 which
translates, of course, to a 10–20% error rate.
More significantly for candidates and those who
support them, the authors conclude that ‘‘regardless
of their cause, proximity errors will not be distributed
equally. The simple fact that candidates appearing at
the top (or bottom) of ballots have no one else listed
before (or after) them means that they are less likely
than other candidates to lose votes as the result of prox-
imity errors,’’121 and indeed, the experiment’s results
supported this hypothesis.122 In other words, those
casting votes for candidates whose names appeared
in the middle positions on the ballot were more likely
to make a proximity mistake when voting, i.e., to vote
for a candidate adjacent to the candidate intended.
Rotation would reduce the impact of proximity
errors. By allowing all candidates to spend equal time
in the favored locations and disfavored locations on
the ballot, rotation can mitigate the impact of predict-
able voter mistakes. Herrnson et al. suggest that their
experiment gives ‘‘election officials concerned with
fairness a reason to rotate candidate names in different
election precincts.’’123 Likewise, legislators and major
political parties should support precinct-level rotation
statutes, which would help to ensure that each candi-
date loses as few votes as possible to voter mistakes.
C. Ballot-flaw-induced votes
A third category of position-influenced votes is
the ballot-flaw-induced vote, caused by flaws in bal-
lot design. The most famous example, as noted, is the
butterfly ballot. But butterfly ballots are not the only
badly designed ballots.124 Other bad designs may
mislead voters in other ways, through placement of
contests, or through language, directions for voting,
or placement of names on the ballot.125 Professor
Susan King Roth, in one of the earliest studies of
usability and election systems, found that voters
voted in error due to bad design.126 She conducted
a study in which she observed 19 voters as they
used a variety of voting technologies, arranged so
that participants could vote on equipment set up as
it was for Ohio’s 1992 general election. She noted
that at least three subjects expressed confusion
about which button on the electronic ballot corre-
sponded with which candidate in the ‘‘Presidential/
Vice-Presidential Candidate’’ section of that ballot:
Referring to presidential candidates Bill Clin-
ton and George Bush, one responded: ‘‘The
square next to (candidate) Clinton’s name
was for the other candidate to the left. The
square for Clinton was to the right.’’ Another
wrote: ‘‘It seemed that the buttons were closer
to the adjoining candidate. I tend to vote by
president’s name but the correct button was
closer to the vice president’s name.’’127
Roth observed that consequences of these types of
ambiguities ‘‘could include lost votes and skewing
of election results.’’128 Ohio uses precinct-level
rotation, however, and Roth hypothesized that the
rotation scheme acted as a fail-safe, preventing the
bad design from having an impact on the election:
‘‘[f]ortunately ballot rotation, the sequential rotation
of candidate names as required by Ohio law, proba-
bly prevented any single candidate from enjoying an
advantage.’’129
Some election analysts presume that if mistakes
occur when voting—such as when Gore voters mis-
takenly voted for Buchanan in the 2000 presidential
election—the mistakes should be blamed on the
voter and not the ballot. If voters have a hard time
finding their candidate on the slate and thus choose
another or skip the contest, the theory goes, that is
because they were not intelligent, did not follow
directions properly, or were not sufficiently devoted
to their candidate.130 As a National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) study noted in
2004, however, ‘‘[i]t is common for users to blame
themselves for their inability to accomplish a task
120Herrnson et al., supra note 18, at 89.
121Id. at 71(footnote omitted).
122Id. at 195, n. 16 (explaining that voters who intended to vote
for candidates at the top or bottom of the contest list made fewer
proximity errors).
123Id. at 71.
124Sarah P. Everett, The Usability of Electronic Voting
Machines and How Votes Can Be Changed Without Detection
11 (Thesis of Ph.D Candidate, Rice University, available at
<http://chil.rice.edu/research/pdf/EverettDissertation.pdf> ) (‘‘poor
ballot design is not limited to punch card ballots. ballot design
inconsistencies can serve to confuse users and create additional
potential for errors’’).
125Id. (citation omitted).
126Susan King Roth, Disenfranchised by Design: Voting Sys-
tems and the Election Process, 9 Info. Design J. 1, 4–5
(No. 1, 1998), available at < http://www.decadeofbehavior
.org/policyseminars/er_roth1998.pdf> .
127Id.
128Id.
129Id.
130See generally, e.g., Designers Vote Down ‘‘Butterfly’’ Bal-
lots, Cox News Service (Nov. 21, 2000).
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with a given system, even though difficulties expe-
rienced may be common across a range of users and
the result of correctable usability problems.’’131
Likewise, the Brennan Center, in its publication
Better Ballots, noted that voting should not measure
which candidate has supporters who are best able to
figure out the voting technology:
Some have dismissed the degree to which poor
ballot design undermines democracy by arguing
that voters only have themselves to blame if they
fail to properly navigate design flaws. This is
unfair. Candidates should win or lose elections
based upon whether or not they are preferred
by a majority of voters, not on whether they
have the largest number of supporters who—as
a result of education and experience—have
greater facility navigating unnecessarily compli-
cated interfaces or complex instructions, or
because fewer of their supporters are elderly or
have reading disabilities. Nor should candidates
win elections because ballot designs happened
to make it more difficult for voters supporting
their opponents to accurately cast their votes.132
In other words, these mistakes happened not
because the voters were unintelligent but because
the voters were human. Most ballots are not
designed by professional designers, and most do
not take into account ‘‘human factor’’133 research.
Understanding how humans interact with various
systems can allow designers to create ballots that
decrease error, while failing to use these designs
can increase human error. As the authors of Better
Ballots indicate, there are many different ways in
which ballots can be badly designed: ‘‘Many prob-
lematic ballot designs present voters with an incon-
sistent design that leads to mistakes.’’134
That infamous ‘‘butterfly ballot’’ from Palm
Beach County, for example, listed half the candi-
dates on the left page and half the candidates on
the right page. Voters were to punch one of a series
of holes down the center of the ballot to cast their
votes for one of the pairs of candidates (i.e., presi-
dent and vice-president) on either side of the
holes. Although the second name listed on the left
page was Al Gore, punching the second hole
resulted in a vote for Pat Buchanan, whose name
was listed first on the right page.
Since the normal ‘‘human’’ way to encounter
written materials is to read in a left-to-right, top-
to-bottom sequence,135 many Gore voters would
have automatically punched the second button to
vote for the name they perceived to be the second
name on the list. Some of these Gore voters may
never have even noticed the names on the right-
hand side of the ballot, nor perceived that those
names were connected to the same set of holes
that were used for the names on the left-hand side
of the ballot. Analysts who studied the Palm
Beach ballot estimate that at least 2,000 Gore voters
cast their ballots for Buchanan instead.136
131Laskowski et al., Improving the Usability and Accessi-
bility of Voting Systems and Products 21, note 9
(National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publi-
cation 500, May 2004).
132Norden et al., supra note 12, at 9–10.
133E.g., the website of ‘‘Human Factors and Ergonomics Soci-
ety’’ describes the Society’s mission as follows: ‘‘The Society’s
mission is to promote the discovery and exchange of knowledge
concerning the characteristics of human beings that are applica-
ble to the design of systems and devices of all kinds. The Soci-
ety furthers serious consideration of contract about the
assignment of appropriate functions for humans and machines,
whether people serve as operators, maintainers, or users in the
system. And, it advocates systematic use of such contract to
achieve compatibility in the design of interactive systems of
people, machines, and environments to ensure their effective-
ness, safety, and ease of performance.’’ < https://www.hfes
.org//Web/AboutHFES/about.html > .
134Norden et al., supra note 12, at 28–36 (noting that on one
ballot, ‘‘[r]eading left-to-right, many voters mistakenly marked
the arrow to the right of a candidate’s name instead of the
arrows to the left. Although the ballot instructions direct voters
to complete the arrows to the left of their choices, there are few
visual cues on the page. The small amount of space between
columns makes it hard for voters to tell which arrow corre-
sponds with the candidate for whom they’d like to vote. It
is easier to see where to vote for whom [when] horizontal align-
ment issues are minimal, especially for paired contests, such as
that for President and Vice-President.’’).
135E.g., id. at 21 (‘‘Voters reading the ballot in traditional book-
form, i.e., from top left to bottom left, followed by top right to
bottom right, likely read Gore as the second name and punched
the second hole without realizing that the second hole corre-
sponded with a vote for Buchanan.’’).
136Wand et al., supra note 13, at 795. Rotation could have sig-
nificantly mitigated the errors caused by the butterfly ballot.
Gore voters would have been much more likely to vote accu-
rately when Gore’s name was the first name on the ballot. Like-
wise, they would have been at least a bit more likely to vote
accurately when his name was listed on the right-hand side of
the ballot, because their automatic tendency to punch the sec-
ond name for the second button would have been interrupted.
Gore’s position as the number two name on the left-hand side
was arguably the worst position for him to be in, from a
human factors perspective. Although it is impossible to be cer-
tain, it is at least plausible that the results of the 2000 presiden-
tial election would have been different if Florida ballots had
precinct-level rotation. In any event, rotation would have
given voters more confidence in the ultimate result.
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Interestingly, one example of how rotation may
have already helped to provide a fail-safe for a
bad ballot design was illustrated by a discussion
of a specific design problem in Better Ballots,
although the authors did not explicitly address the
benefits of rotation. The report describes 13 sepa-
rate kinds of ballot-design problems, including a
problem described as ‘‘Leaving Columns or Rows
for Disqualified Candidates.’’137 The authors illus-
trate the problem by discussing the ballot in Mont-
gomery County, Ohio, in 2004. That year, Ralph
Nader was disqualified as a candidate for president
after several counties in Ohio had programmed their
vote-tallying machines to read ballots with his
name.138 Montgomery County, and perhaps some
others, replaced the name of Nader and his running
mate with the words ‘‘candidate removed.’’139
Montgomery County, like all Ohio counties, rotates
its ballots by precinct, and there were four presiden-
tial candidates whose names remained on the ballot;
Nader’s slot on the ballot made for a total of five
presidential slots. In 1/5 of the precincts in that
county, therefore, ‘‘candidate removed’’ was the
top ‘‘candidate’’ listed; in 1/5 of the precincts, ‘‘can-
didate removed’’ was listed second, and so on. In 1/
5 of the precincts, ‘‘candidate removed’’ was listed
third. The ballot in those precincts, therefore, prob-
ably looked something like the ballot in Table 1.
The study noted that there were high residual
vote rates in the 1/5 of the precincts in which ‘‘can-
didate removed’’ appeared in the third slot. The
authors theorized that voters chose a candidate
from the first two names on the list (Bush and
Kerry) and then spoiled their ballots by selecting
another candidate from the second two names (Per-
outka and Badnarik).140
The residual vote rate was much lower in other
precincts, and the lower rate may well have resulted
from a less confusing ballot. For example, in 1/5 of
the precincts, the ballots probably looked something
like the ballot in Table 2.
The authors quote a study that noted that ‘‘in the
33 precincts in Dayton in which voters saw this bal-
lot rotation [with ‘‘candidate removed’’ appearing
between Bush and Kerry above and Peroutka and
Badnarik below], an average of 2.6% of all voters
overvoted. This compares to just 1.1% of voters,
on average, in Dayton precincts that saw other rota-
tions.’’141 Appropriately, the authors discuss the
overvoting problem that the ‘‘candidate removed’’
tag caused, particularly in some precincts with
many voters of lower socio-economic status.142
The authors of Better Ballots do not note, how-
ever, the significance of the fact that this problem
occurred in only 1/5 of the precincts. In many states,
the problematic rotation would have been the exact
rotation in use in 100% of the precincts: the two
major candidates first, followed by the independent
candidates in order of party vote share in previous
elections.143 Since Nader had been on the ballot in
2000, he likely would have been the third candidate
under the ballot ordering laws in those states, thus
Table 2. Ballot Listing ‘‘Candidate Removed’’
in Second Position
Kerry ,
Candidate removed
Peroutka ,
Badnarik ,
Bush ,
Table 1. Ballot Listing ‘‘Candidate Removed’’
in Third Position
Bush ,
Kerry ,
Candidate removed
Peroutka ,
Badnarik ,
137Norden et al., supra note 12, at 32.
138Id.
139Id.
140The ballot illustration indicates that Montgomery County
used a punch-card ballot, which allows voters to ‘‘overvote’’
and thus spoil their ballots; if Montgomery County had used
DRE machines or lever machines, it would have been physi-
cally impossible for voters to ‘‘overvote’’ the contest. Of course,
some optical-scan ballots do allow overvotes, and their use
could have led to a similar problems.
141Norden et al., supra note 12, at 33 (citing Jacobs, supra
note 24, at 4). Presumably, the other ballot positions did not
lead to a disproportionate number of overvotes because it was
the only rotation that had at least two candidates on each side
of the ‘‘candidate removed’’ position. When the ‘‘candidate
removed’’ tag was in the top or the bottom position, all four
of the other candidates were clumped together. Likewise,
when the ‘‘candidate removed’’ tag was in the second or fourth
position, the other names were in groups of one and three and
three and one, respectively, thus interfering with the voter’s
automatic response to choose one from between two candi-
dates.
142Norden et al., supra note 12, at 33 (noting that some pre-
cincts with low socio-economic levels had residual vote rates as
high as 15.56%) (citing Jacobs, supra note 24, at 4).
143For example, in Maryland, ballot ordering is based on the
popularity of the parties. Md. Election Law Code Ann.
x 9-210 (2011).
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dictating the exact contest list that led to the high
residual vote rate in 1/5 of the precincts in Mont-
gomery County. Further, the authors highlight the
overvoting caused in the precincts with voters of
lower socio-economic status. At least some of the
precincts that surrounded those high-overvoting
precincts, however, were likely to have had similar
demographic characteristics, yet because they had
a less problematic ballot design, the voters in
those precincts presumably cast fewer overvotes.
The overall residual rate in the 4/5 of the precincts
with less problematic contest lists was 1.1%,144
less than half of the rate that occurred in the 1/5
of precincts with the problematic contest list;
these precincts had an overall residual rate of
2.6%.145 Interestingly, George W. Bush won Ohio
by 2.1% of the vote.146
The authors are correct to point out the problems
with ‘‘candidate removed’’ slots on the ballot, and to
suggest solutions,147 but they admit that completely
preventing the problem is not always possible.148
The final decision disqualifying Nader from the bal-
lot, for example, was not handed down until October
25, ‘‘just one week before election day.’’149
The Nader case is an excellent illustration of the
fail-safe benefits of rotation. If Ohio had used
fixed-position ballots, and all of the counties had
used ballots that allowed overvotes (e.g., certain
optical scan or punchcard ballots), the legitimacy
of Ohio’s electoral votes might have been thrown
into doubt.150 Ohio did have rotation, however,
and that rotation may well have prevented 1.5%
of the voters from overvoting, operating as a fail-
safe that mitigated the impact of the last-minute
design problem.
Further, both the butterfly ballot and the Mont-
gomery County ballot show the limits of instruc-
tions in the face of bad design. Norden et al.
discuss the problems of accurate instructions com-
bined with poor ‘‘visual cues’’;151 in other words,
some voters pay more attention to visual cues
than to instructions. Both the butterfly and Mont-
gomery County ballots caused problems because
of the intuitive, human ways in which many voters
reacted to visual cues: on the butterfly ballot, vot-
ers punched the second hole for what they perceived
to be the second name; on the Montgomery County
ballot, voters double-voted by voting for what they
perceived to be a separate set of candidates. Thus,
effective design is even more important than effec-
tive instructions. If the design is good, voters’ intui-
tive reactions will be correct, and the instructions
will be less significant; if the design is bad, it is fore-
seeable that a percentage of voters will ignore
instructions and vote intuitively, in the same way
that some people put together a television cabinet
without consulting the instruction booklet. Rotation
is a necessary fail-safe for both bad instructions
and bad design.
Rotation can reduce the impact of position-
influenced votes caused by primacy effect, and by
both proximity-mistake votes and ballot-flaw-induced
votes. Because a certain percentage of position-
influenced votes foreseeably result from human inter-
action with voting systems, and because after-the-fact
fixes are difficult, costly, and potentially unfair,152
states should implement precinct-level rotation.
144Indeed, the author of the original study focused on precincts
that used two different ballots (called the A-2 and A-3 ballots)
and noted that ‘‘the group of A-2 precincts and the group of A-3
precincts should contain similar cross sections of Dayton’s pop-
ulation.’’ Jacobs, supra note 24, at 3.
145Norden et al., supra note 12, at 32.
1462004 General Election Results – Ohio, U.S. Election
Atlas (last accessed June 24, 2012), available at http://
uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/> .
147Norden et al., supra note 12, at 34.
148Id. at 32.
149Id. (citing Reid Forgrove, Nader’s Name Is on the Ballot, But
You Can’t Cast a Vote for Him, Cincinnati Enquirer (Oct.
20, 2004)).
150As noted above, Bush won Ohio by 2.1% of the vote. 2004
General Election Results—Ohio,U.S. Election Atlas, avail-
able at < http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/> (last accessed
June 24, 2012). If all Ohio counties had used the same technol-
ogy as Montgomery County, and if these counties had used
fixed-position ballots with ‘‘candidate removed’’ as the middle
of five names (a very plausible scenario), Ohio might well have
had a much higher residual vote rate that could have been lain at
the feet of bad ballot design. Fortunately, many Ohio counties
used different voting technology; even more fortunately,
Ohio’s use of precinct-level rotation spread the impact of any
bad designs.
151SeeNorden et al., supra note 12, at 28 (noting the problem
of response options on both sides of a candidate name, and that
on one ballot, ‘‘the ballot instructions direct voters to complete
the arrows to the left of their choices, [but] there are few visual
cues on the page,’’ and that ‘‘many voters mistakenly marked
the arrow to the right of a candidate’s name instead of the
arrows to the left’’).
152Voting: What Is, What Could Be 42 (Report of the
CALTECH/MIT Voting Technology Project ( July 2001)),
available at < http://www.vote.caltech.edu/drupal/files/report/
voting_what_is_what_could_be.pdf > (hereinafter CAL-
TECH/MIT Report) (The report explains problems with
‘‘re-votes’’ by observing that, ‘‘if a single seat determined con-
trol of the legislature, then the revote would be not just about
this seat, but about which party would govern the legislature.’’).
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D. The limited significance of opportunities
to correct errors
As indicated above, much of the attention
devoted to ballot design has been focused on pre-
venting undervotes and overvotes. It is true that
HAVA requires that direct-recording electronic
(DRE) ballots provide opportunities for review
and correction of vote selections.153 This opportu-
nity is an important one, but the opportunity to
review does not eliminate the problems of posi-
tion-influenced votes. In one observation of actual
voters using a paper ballot system, ‘‘less than one-
third of the voters compared the paper ballots with
the screen in order to verify all their selections.’’154
In their study, Herrnson et al. observed that of sub-
jects who were specifically instructed to pay atten-
tion to the voter verification system, ‘‘many.did
not spend the time needed to verify every candidate
they selected, even on the relatively short ballot.’’155
The authors also expressed concern that correcting
errors ‘‘would add time to the voting process and
require steps with which most voters are unfamil-
iar.’’156 When their subjects were instructed to
change votes, many failed to make the changes
due to the extra work involved in doing so.157
This reality may be the result of three problems.
First, American voters must cast a high number of
votes in most contests; the sample election in the
Herrnson et al. study, for example, required voters
to cast approximately 21 votes, a smaller number
than many voters cast in significant November elec-
tions. Certainly, with that many votes to review dur-
ing the limited time in the voting booth, voters may
miss some of their mistakes. Second, voters may be
unfamiliar with the equipment on which they vote.
As noted above, at most, voters cast ballots no
more than twice per year, and due to privacy issues
and lack of feedback on certain voting systems, they
may never learn whether they are voting accurately.
Voters who are uncertain about how to correct a vot-
ing error may be unwilling to spend the cognitive
costs, time costs, or reputation costs needed to
change votes.
This concept may be particularly true as to a third
problem related to correcting voting errors. Studies
of ‘‘fall off’’ and ‘‘roll off’’ reveal that many voters
choose to vote only in contests near the top of the
ticket, and pay less attention to voting when they
reach later contests in the ballot.158 Perhaps obvi-
ously, a percentage of voters who were not fully
committed to their votes in certain contests may
be unwilling to spend time, cognitive, and reputa-
tion costs to fix voting errors. These voters might
be willing to correct a vote, say, for a presidential
candidate, but might be unwilling to exert the effort
for county coroner.
Sunstein and Thaler discuss the ‘‘status quo bias’’
and the ‘‘yeah, whatever’’ heuristic: ‘‘Many people
will take whatever option requires the least effort,
or the path of least resistance. All of these forces
imply that if, for a given choice, there is a default
option—an option that will obtain if the chooser
does nothing—then we can expect a large number
of people to end up with that option, whether or
not it is good for them.’’159
The ‘‘yeah, whatever’’ heuristic may be one facet
of primacy effect, because voting for the first option
takes the least effort. It becomes even more signifi-
cant, however, when a voter makes a voting error.
That wrong vote then becomes the default—‘‘an
option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing.’’
In the case of a mistaken vote, the chooser has already
done something, so the default is the option that will
obtain if the chooser does nothingmore. Then the sta-
tus quo bias kicks in, so even if voters are given the
chance to correct the mistake (which good choice
architecture should allow), they will be less likely
to do so. Thus, good choice architecture should not
just allow choosers to correct their mistakes; it should
be designed so that the number of mistakes is as low
15342 U.S.C. x 15481 (requiring that certain voting systems
must ‘‘provide the voter with the opportunity (in a private and
independent manner) to change the ballot or correct any error
before the ballot is cast and counted (including the opportunity
to correct the error through the issuance of a replacement ballot
if the voter was otherwise unable to change the ballot or correct
any error)’’; see also Norden et al., supra note 12, at 16 (rec-
ommending on a ‘‘Ballot Design Checklist’’ that electronic bal-
lots ‘‘[i]nstruct voters to review their selections and provide
clear instructions on how to change a selection’’).
154Herrnson et al., supra note 18, at 122 (discussing obser-
vation at a Nevada election in 2004) (citation omitted).
155Id. at 122.
156Id. at 127.
157Id. at 77 (finding that accuracy rates drop 5–12 percentage
points when voters change a vote, noting that on various sys-
tems, some voters were ‘‘unwilling or unable’’ to make the
change, or did not make the change ‘‘[i]n response to the
extra work involved’’).
158E.g., Augenblick and Nicholson, supra note 12, at 23 (‘‘We
find that voters are more likely to abstain and more likely to rely
on decision shortcuts, such as voting for the status quo or the
first candidate listed in a race, as the ballot position of a contest
falls.’’).
159Thaler and Sunstein, supra note 7, at 83.
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as possible and that any mistakes are spread as evenly
as possible among all the choices.
To sum up, the following consequences of candi-
date name ordering on ballots are reasonably fore-
seeable:
(1) In all elections, a small percentage of voters—
perhaps as high as 6%—will be influenced by
ballots as they interact with them, leading
them to decide to cast primacy-effect votes
in favor of the candidates listed first in each
contest. If the ballot is a fixed-position ballot,
the same candidate in each contest will receive
all of the primacy-effect votes; if the ballot is
rotated by precinct, the primacy-effect votes
will be distributed fairly equally.
(2) In all elections, even those with well-designed
ballots, a small percentage of voters—.25% to
2% or more—will cast proximity-mistake votes
for a candidate they did not intend to sup-
port.160 If the ballot is a fixed-position ballot,
the same candidate(s)—those in the middle of
the contest list—will be more likely to lose
vote share to these proximity mistakes. If the
ballot is rotated by precinct, the proximity-
mistake votes will be distributed fairly equally.
(3) In some elections, previously undetected flaws
in ballot design will lead a small percentage of
voters—.5 to 1%161 or more—to make a spe-
cific mistake or set of mistakes. If the ballot
is a fixed-position ballot, the same candi-
date(s) will gain all of any miscast vote
share, and the same candidate(s) will lose all
of the miscast vote share. If the ballot is
rotated by precinct, the ballot-flaw induced
votes will be distributed fairly equally.
(4) In all elections, a percentage of voters who
make proximity mistakes or ballot-flaw-in-
duced mistakes will be unwilling or unable
to accurately correct their mistakes, even if
they are made aware of them.162
(5) Some contests in each election cycle will be
decided by margins of 1% or less, meaning
that the margin of victory will be smaller
than the likely percentage of position-influ-
enced votes. Thus, the same voter behaviors
could lead to a different result in states with
fixed-position ballots than they would in states
where the ballots were rotated by precinct.
Because rotation mitigates the impact of mis-
takes, ballots that are rotated by precinct are,
therefore, likely to reflect voter intent more
accurately.
Accordingly, candidates (and, by extension, their
supporters)163 have an interest in being placed in a
favored position on the ballot—a position that is
less likely to lead to voter mistakes. More accu-
rately, perhaps, these candidates have an interest
in not being placed in a disfavored ballot position.
The problem of position-influenced votes is a
real one and has certainly affected the outcome of
some elections. The question is whether courts or
legislatures are willing to fix the problem.
IV. MAKING ROTATION HAPPEN
Some might question why states should bother
with rotation. To implement rotation effectively,
election officials have to determine the rotation
appropriate for each contest and to design programs
160This prediction presumes a best-case scenario of a well-
designed ballot. It does not take into account voting mistakes
that result from flaws in ballot design.
161Research indicates that at least .74% of the Gore voters in
Palm Beach County cast valid, mistaken votes for Pat
Buchanan. This total does not include those voters who cast
mistaken votes and then invalidated their votes when trying to
correct their mistakes. See Steve Bousquet and Thomas C.
Tobin, Without Overvotes Gore Was Doomed: Thousands of
Votes Were Rejected Because of Extra Marks Emphasizing
the Voters’ Real Choice, St. Petersburg Times (Nov. 12,
2001), available at < http://www.sptimes.com/News/111201/
Lostvotes/Without_overvotes_Gor.shtml > (noting that ‘‘5,352
Palm Beach County voters punched holes for both Gore and
Pat Buchanan. Another 2,864 voters punched holes for both
Gore and Socialist David McReynolds, whose name also was
across from Gore’s.[and] 1,676 Palm Beach County voters
punched holes for both Bush and Buchanan.’’). Researchers
who analyzed the 2000 presidential election in Palm Beach
County concluded that at least 2,000 of the votes cast for Pat
Buchanan in that county were mistaken votes that voters
intended to cast for Al Gore. Wand et al., supra note 13, at
795. Gore received 268,945 votes in Palm Beach County, or
270,945, counting the 2,000 miscast votes. See also Richard
L. Smith, A Statistical Assessment of Buchanan’s Vote in
Palm Beach County, 17 Statistical Sci. 441–57 (2002), avail-
able at < http://www.stat.unc.edu/postscript/rs/pap4.pdf >
(concluding that at least 2,500 of Buchanan’s votes were mis-
cast votes by Gore supporters).
162Herrnson et al., supra note 18, at 77, 122, 127 (noting a
5–12% increase in error rates when voters change votes, and
observing frequent unwillingness to review or correct votes).
163E.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) (‘‘[t]he
rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend them-
selves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always
have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters’’).
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and protocols that will rotate the candidate names
accurately.164 While this change in ballot prepara-
tion may take some effort, we know that rotation
is feasible because it has been used in several states
without significant incident.165 Admittedly, rotation
does add some cost to ballot preparation,166
although the cost will vary depending on the voting
technologies in use in a given state.167
The expenses of precinct-level rotation are worth-
while, however. The right to vote—and to vote accu-
rately—is of vital importance. As stated earlier, the
most fundamental principle of any democracy is
that ‘‘the people should choose whom they please
to govern them.’’168 The United States Supreme
Court has observed about the right to vote, ‘‘‘[n]o
right is more precious in a free country than that of
having a voice in the election of those who make
the laws under which, as good citizens, we must
live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory
if the right to vote is undermined.’’’169 And the Car-
ter-Baker Commission noted in 2005 that ‘‘[c]itizens
should be confident that the results of the election
reflect their decision.’’170
The combination of position-influenced votes
with fixed-position ballots imposes a needless bur-
den on the right to vote because it increases the
chances of an inaccurate or controversial electoral
result. Even if we leave aside claims that up to
6% of the vote in a given contest may be affected
by primacy effect,171 it is disturbing that a major
study has shown that a 2–3% error rate is common
across voting systems even for voters completing
the simplest voting tasks, with a higher rate for vot-
ing tasks that are more complex.172 As the authors
of that study have observed, ‘‘even a 2–3 percent
error rate is large enough to change the outcome
of some elections (assuming the errors are dispro-
portionately in one direction).’’173 By its nature,
of course, a fixed-position ballot tends to direct
errors disproportionately in one direction.
When a state places a candidate’s name in the
middle of a three-candidate list on a fixed-position
ballot, that candidate knows that more of his or her
supporters are likely to vote inaccurately than will
the supporters of the candidates whose names the
state placed in the first or last position.174 If two
to three percent of voters are likely to cast mis-
taken votes in any given contest, and if more voters
are likely to cast mistaken votes when aiming for
candidates who are not in the top or bottom posi-
tion of a candidate list, then it stands to reason
that the middle candidate will lose a dispropor-
tionate number of votes on that fixed-position bal-
lot. If that candidate were running for office in a
state with precinct-level rotation, in contrast,
each of the three candidates in the contest would
be in the disfavored middle position in one-third
of the precincts, thus spreading the predictable
164Presumably, of course, states implementing new precinct-
level rotation statutes can seek guidance from the dozen or so
states that already use some system of ballot rotation. See
Miller, supra note 39, at 380 (noting that twelve states currently
use ‘‘some form of rotation’’ in statewide general elections).
Further, the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has identi-
fied rotation as at least a ‘‘supported voting variation’’ as part of
the ‘‘Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) that set the
standards against which voting systems are tested.’’ U.S. Elec-
tion Assistance Commission: Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request
(Feb. 13, 2012), available at < http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/
Documents/FY%202013%20CBJ%20Feb%2010%202012–
FINAL.pdf > ); < http://www.eac.gov/testing_and_certification/
voluntary_voting_system_guidelines.aspx> .
165E.g., Miller, supra note 39, at 380 (noting that twelve states
currently use ‘‘some form of rotation’’ in statewide general elec-
tions).
166E.g., Alvarez et al., supra note 90, at 52 (noting costs in
expense and possible voter confusion).
167See id. (indicating that electronic voting may decrease some
costs associated with rotation).
168U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 783 (citing
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 547 (internal quotation
marks omitted)) (holding that states could not ban members
of Congress from appearing on the ballot after certain number
of terms, even if it allowed them to be elected via write-in
votes).
169Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
170Carter-Baker Report, supra note 36, at 6.
171E.g., Krosnick et al., supra note 22, at 66 (results of a study
of the 2000 elections in Ohio and North Dakota showing pri-
macy effects in two-candidate contests that ranged from
1.41% to 6.32%, with an average of 2.88%).
172Herrnson et al., supra note 18, at 73, 89 (studies of
more than 1500 voters found that ‘‘[w]hen voters used an
office-bloc ballot with no special tasks, they cast accurate
ballots more than 97 percent of the time. Where more
than one candidate was to be elected to a given office, or
where voters changed a vote, many more errors were com-
mitted.’’).
173Id. at 73 (emphasis added).
174Id. at 195, n. 16 (noting that voters who planned to vote for
either the first or last candidate on a list committed fewer prox-
imity errors than those who intended to vote for candidates
other than the first or last candidate—i.e., those in the middle
of the list).
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proximity mistakes more equally among all three
candidates.
The two-to-three percent error rate would per-
haps be less troubling, even in states with fixed-
position ballots, if slim margins of victory were
more rare. Alas, however, that is not the case; it is
easy to find elections that have been won by less
than three percent of the vote. In 2001, the authors
of a CalTech/MIT study observed that ‘‘[c]lose elec-
tions, problematic votes, and recounts occur in
every election year and in every jurisdiction.’’175
Since most states that have recount statutes require
a margin of 1% or less,176 the fact that recounts are
common indicates that slim margins of victory are
common. A search for narrow margins of victory
in the 2010 general election quickly yields articles
in newspapers discussing many such elections,177
including gubernatorial contests in Ohio (2%)178
and Minnesota (less than .5%), respectively.179
Further, because position-influenced voting is
largely invisible, voters are unlikely to call for reform
unless and until they experience an election with cat-
astrophic problems that could have been avoided by
rotated ballots—and waiting for catastrophe is gener-
ally not the best way to determine public policy.180
Even in catastrophe, an election that goes bad
can rarely be set right. The ‘‘ounce of prevention’’
that ballot rotation provides is important because
flawed election processes are nearly impossible
to fix after the fact. As the Supreme Court observed
in Burson v. Freeman, ‘‘the remedy for a tainted
election is an imperfect one.’’181 The authors of the
CalTech/MIT study have noted that ‘‘[r]evotes are a
bad way of settling contested elections because the
election is no longer the same.’’182
States should use well-designed ballots and voter
education programs to prevent predictable voter mis-
takes. Because they can never prevent all voter mis-
takes, however, they should do what they reasonably
can to prevent the impact of those mistakes. It is one
thing to shrug off the problem of voters who make a
voting decision that was influenced by the order of
175CALTECH/MIT Report, supra note 152, at 6.
176See, e.g., Rob Richie and Emily Hellman, A Survey and
Analysis of Statewide Election Recounts, 2000–2009 at p. 7
(Apr. 2011), available at < http://www.fairvote.org/assets/
Uploads/Recounts2011Final.pdf > (‘‘Ten states automatically
conduct a recount within a margin of 0.5 percent between the
top two candidates, four states automatically hold a recount if
the margin is 1 percent or less, three do so at margins of
0.1% up to 0.25 percent, and one (Michigan) conducts auto-
matic recounts for margins equal to or below 2,000 votes.
Three additional states do not have automatic recount laws
although allow recounts in the case of an exact tie’’); see gen-
erally the State Recount Laws Searchable Database created
by the Minnesota Center for Electoral Integrity, available at
< http://ceimn.org/ceimn-state-recount-laws-searchable-data-
base > .
177E.g., Charley Shaw, District 15B Recount: Minnesota DFLer
Concedes in Election Decided by 10 Votes, Legal Ledger (St.
Paul, MN, Nov. 29, 2010) (describing three state house contests
that resulted in recounts); After Recount, Bowman Wins Senate
Seat by 71 Votes, Telegraph Herald (Dubuque, IA, Nov. 25,
2010) (describing Iowa state senate contest with margin of
victory of less than 1%); Pivotal Recount Looms in Texas
House District 48, Texas Independent (Nov. 24, 2010)
(discussing recount plans in contest where original margin of
victory was 16 votes).
178 < http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/electResults
Main/2010results/20101102governor.aspx> (Amended official
results showing winner with 49.04% of the vote and second
place finisher with 47.04% of the vote).
179The website of the Minnesota Secretary of State reported that
the winning candidate received 43.63% of the vote, and the next
most popular candidate received 43.21% of the vote. < http://
electionresults.sos.state.mn.us/20101102/ElecRslts.asp?M=S&
Races= 0331> .
180See generally Gerken, supra note 41, at 1585. Gerken notes
that election problems in general are ‘‘largely invisible’’ to vot-
ers and that when those problems become visible, the focus of
both the public and election officials tends to stay on the prob-
lems that have been revealed. The Carter-Baker study, for
example, devoted a chapter to voting technology without any
significant discussion of the problem of voter error; instead,
the report was focused on the problem of whether officials
were able to use technology to accurately count the votes that
were cast. Carter-Baker Report, supra note 36, at 6 (noting
that one of the five ‘‘pillars’’ of electoral reform was ‘‘[v]oting
machines that tabulate voter preferences accurately and trans-
parently, minimize under- and over-votes, and allow for verifi-
ability and full recounts’’).
181Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. at 208. In a footnote, the
court distinguished the burdens of rerunning a trial from
those of rerunning an election, noting, however, that ‘‘even
in the fair trial context, we reaffirmed that, given the impor-
tance of the countervailing right, ‘our system of law has
always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfair-
ness.’’’ Id. at 209, fn. 12, (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333, 352 (1966)) (Burson court’s emphasis); see also
Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reform-
ing U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Melt-
down, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 937, 945–46 (2005) (‘‘The
costs of post-election review are large: The pressure put on
courts to decide arcane election law questions when the out-
come of an election is on the line—especially a presidential
election—is huge, and the appearance of partisan decision-
making is inevitable.’’).
182CALTECH/MIT Report, supra note 152, at 42 (continu-
ing by explaining that, ‘‘[f]or example, if a single seat deter-
mined control of the legislature, then the revote would be not
just about this seat, but about which party would govern the leg-
islature’’).
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names on the ballot.183 It is quite another to shrug off
the problem of ballot positions and ballot designs that
lead voters to miscast votes: these ballots are inhibit-
ing people from ‘‘choosing whom they please’’ to
govern them. Likewise, when states refuse to use
available systems to mitigate the electoral impact of
foreseeable voter behaviors, they are interfering
with the freedom of voters to elect the candidates
of their choice.
Certainly, not every election is decided by position-
influenced votes. But rotated ballots are a remedy
that can be imposed only before the election. The
limits on post-election fixes are appropriate, but
they increase the obligation of election officials to
do all they can before the election to mitigate the
impact of foreseeable and predictable voter behav-
ior. Ballot rotation represents a last-best-chance to
avoid the electoral impact of foreseeable and
unforeseeable voter error and ballot design issues.
Individual candidates and their supporters have
brought a variety of lawsuits to challenge fixed-
position ballot ordering statutes. Although lawsuits
will probably continue, litigation may not be the
best means for achieving precinct-level ballot rota-
tion.184 Recent research, however, may encourage
legislatures to enact ballot rotation as a way to fairly
distribute the votes miscast due to predictable prox-
imity mistakes and to avoid the election catastrophes
that can be caused by sometimes-unavoidable ballot-
design problems.
A. Litigation
Candidates have challenged fixed-position bal-
lots on constitutional grounds for decades,185 and
they will probably continue to do so. Usually argu-
ing that these ballots violate the first and fourteenth
amendment rights of candidates or of their support-
ers by diluting votes or denying equal protection (or
both),186 these plaintiffs have found inconsistent
success as courts debate the appropriate legal stan-
dard and the sufficiency of evidence.187
183Sonneman v. State, 969 P.2d at 641 (upholding a fixed-
position ballot statute and noting that ‘‘[r]egardless of where a
candidate’s name appears on the ballot, the people use free will
in voting and the winner is elected based on their will only’’).
184Professor Heather Gerken has observed that law professors
and social scientists are full of ideas for how to reform
elections, but that too few of them have analyzed the ‘‘here to
there’’ problem: How to get from the idea for election reform
(i.e., ‘‘here’’) to the implementation of the idea for election
reform (‘‘there’’). Gerken, supra note 32, at 6–7. This article
will make a brief effort to do so, although I agree with Professor
Gerken that identifying needed reforms is much easier than
identifying a viable way to ensure that the reform actually
takes place.
185E.g., Culliton v. Board of Election Comm’rs, 419 F. Supp.
126, 129 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (holding that Republican-first provi-
sion violated equal protection clause), aff’d and remanded
sub nom. on other grounds by, Sangmeister v. Woodard, 565
F.2d 460, 464 (7th Cir. 1977); Gould v. Grubb, 536 P.2d
1337, 1345–46 (Cal. 1975) (holding that incumbent-first and
alphabetical listing violated equal protection principles); Elliott
v. Secretary of State, 294 N.W. 171, 173 (Mich. 1940) (ordering
the rotation of names on a non-partisan ballot for Supreme
Court Justice and observing that ‘‘[i]t is a commonly known
and accepted fact that in an election, either primary or general,
where a number of candidates or nominees for the same office
are before the electorate, those whose names appear at the head
of the list have a distinct advantage’’ (citingGroesbeck v. Board
of State Canvassers, 232 N.W. 387 (Mich. 1930)).
186E.g., Gould v. Grubb, 536 P.2d at 1338, 1343 (finding uncon-
stitutional a ballot ordering system that placed incumbents in
the top position, noting vote dilution and equal protection con-
cerns).
187E.g., Green Party of Tennessee v. Hargett, 700 F.3d 816,
827 (6th Cir. 2012) (reversing and remanding case in which
district court found that a fixed-position ballot violated the
First Amendment when it listed candidates based on party
popularity, noting that the plaintiffs had presented no studies
showing bias in that state’s ballots, and so the district court
had ‘‘no basis’’ on which to hold that the statute was uncon-
stitutional ‘‘on its face’’); Akins v. Secretary of State, 904
A.2d 702, 706 (N.H. 2006) (invalidating New Hampshire bal-
lot ordering statute based on an ‘‘equal right [for qualified
inhabitants of the state] to be elected into office’’) (citing
N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 11); Schaefer v. Lamone, 2006
U.S. Dist. Lexis 96855 at *14 (D. Md. Nov. 30, 2006) aff’d,
248 Fed. App’x. 484 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding no equal protec-
tion violation in statute that requires alphabetical ordering of
candidates); Koppell v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 108
F. Supp. 2d at 360 (finding constitutional a primary ballot
system that mandates a lottery in the 57 counties outside of
New York City and rotation within the city); Sonneman v.
State, 969 P.2d at 640–41 (upholding a fixed-position ballot
statute under first and fourteenth amendments); Gould v.
Grubb, 536 P.2d at 1338, 1347 (invalidating an incumbents-
first ballot order based on federal constitutional principles);
Interestingly, most if not all plaintiffs, perhaps unaware of
the impact of proximity mistake votes and ballot-flaw-in-
duced votes, have focused solely on primacy-effect votes.
Further, some of these plaintiffs have not sought a court
order mandating rotation, which would spread evenly the
benefits and burdens of the various locations in the ballot
order. Instead, these plaintiffs have often sought merely to
increase the chances that their candidate will receive the ben-
efit of the first position. E.g., Green Party of Tennessee v.
Hargett, 2012 WL 379774 at *52 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 3,
2012) (court agreed with plaintiffs’ proposed remedy of
‘‘placement of candidates [in order] based upon public draw-
ing of lots or other random method’’), rev’d and remanded,
700 F.3d at 827.
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A complete discussion of appropriate litigation
strategies is beyond the scope of this article. Plain-
tiffs might be more likely to succeed, however, if
they broaden the basis of their claims from concerns
about primacy-effect votes alone (which, as noted,
are usually votes that are cast accurately and counted
accurately). Plaintiffs might use recent research to
argue that fixed-position ballots create a constitu-
tional violation because of proximity-mistake votes.
Courts analyzing electoral administration cases
typically use a test that has been developed over sev-
eral decades. The test considers how the alleged ‘‘bur-
den’’ put on voters by the administrative requirement
is related to voter qualifications and whether it is an
‘‘evenhanded restriction’’ that protects the integrity
and reliability of the voting process.188 Burdens that
are characterized as ‘‘severe’’ have typically been sub-
ject to strict scrutiny.189 Whatever the level of the bur-
den, it is then balanced against the interests that the
state has put forward to justify the burden.190 As the
Supreme Court observed in Crawford v. Marion
County Election Board, ‘‘[h]owever slight that burden
may appear.it must be justified by relevant and legit-
imate state interests ‘sufficiently weighty to justify the
limitation.’’191 Unfortunately, as some have noted, this
test leaves wide room for interpretation.192
Although plaintiffs have argued that a fixed-position
ballot statute creates a severe burden when its results
can change the outcomes of some elections, courts
have not always been sympathetic to that argument.193
Yet, when determining the appropriate level of scrutiny,
courts have considered not only the magnitude of the
burden on individual voters, but also whether the bur-
den is discriminatory. For example, they have justified
holdings in favor of a state’s electoral administration
decisions by noting that the state’s decisions were
‘‘neutral’’194 or ‘‘non-discriminatory.’’195 Opponents
of fixed-position ballots might be able to argue that
fixed-position ballots are not ‘‘neutral’’ because state
legislatures are aware of the supposed benefits of the
first position,196 and they are specifically designing
the ballot to grant that benefit to an incumbent or to
one or both of the two major parties.
More significantly, plaintiffs may be able to use
current research to argue that fixed-position ballots
are not non-discriminatory because they discrimi-
nate against supporters of candidates in the disfa-
vored positions on the ballot and dilute the votes
for those candidates. When state laws operate to
assign those disfavored positions to a particular can-
didate—any particular candidate—that candidate is
more likely to lose votes due to that state-assigned
ballot position. The ballot therefore discriminates
against that candidate and, more importantly for
first amendment and equal protection purposes,
against the supporters of that candidate.
In other words, this type of fixed-position ballot,
when coupled with the realities of how human
beings vote, could be considered unconstitutional
because it constitutes ‘‘arbitrary and disparate
188Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. at 189–
90 (citing Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663
(1966) and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780 (1983)).
189Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. at 190.
190Id.
191Id. (citing Norman v. Reed, 502 U. S. 279, 288–289 (1992)).
192E.g., Daniel P. Tokaji and Allison R. Hayward, The Role of
Judges in Election Law, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra
273, 278 (2011) (Tokaji states that the ‘‘obvious problem with
this generic standard is that it provides little guidance in resolv-
ing hard cases, particularly ones where the evidence is scant or
conflicting.’’).
193E.g., Sonneman v. State, 969 P.2d at 638, 639 n. 7 (finding
that fixed-position ballot ‘‘allocates the benefit of positional
bias’’ through its random selection of one candidate for the
top position, and that this so-called ‘‘allocation’’ of primacy
effect votes places a ‘‘lesser burden’’ on the right to vote,
even though it accepted as true allegation that primacy effect
affects 5–7% of votes cast, and that elections in Alaska are
‘‘often decided by margins less than 5%’’).
194Weber v. Shelley, 347 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003) (find-
ing that use of DRE machines that lacked a voter-verified paper
trail did not violate equal protection or due process, even
though these machines did not allow certain methods of ballot
recounts, and concluding that ‘‘[s]o long as their choice is rea-
sonable and neutral, it is free from judicial second-guessing’’).
195E.g., Morrison v. Colley, 467 F.3d 503, 507(6th Cir. 2006)
(finding that requiring independent candidates to claim that
they were not affiliated with a political party did not violate
their constitutional rights, and that ‘‘[l]esser burdens.trigger
less exacting review, and a State’s ‘‘‘regulatory interests’’’
will usually be enough to justify ‘‘‘reasonable, nondiscrimina-
tory restrictions’’’ (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,
434 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 788; Norman
v. Reed, 502 U.S. at 288–89 (requiring ‘‘corresponding interest
sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation’’)).
196E.g., Green Party of Tennessee v. Hargett, 2012 WL 913259
at *7 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 16, 2012) (refusing to stay court order
requiring drawing of lots to determine ballot order (after court
had invalidated statute that gave preferential ballot placement to
the ‘‘majority party’’) and observing that ‘‘the mere fact of [the
statute’s] enactment reasonably reflects the [majority] party’s
view or perception that preferential placement on the ballot
has political and election value.’’); original decision rev’d and
remanded, 700 F.3d at 827 (noting lack of evidence of bias in
Tennessee’s ballots).
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treatment’’ that ‘‘value[s] one person’s vote over
that of another.’’197 As the Supreme Court observed
in Bush v. Gore, ‘‘[i]t must be remembered that ‘the
right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or
dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as
effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exer-
cise of the franchise.’’’198 Accordingly, when states,
by the operation of law, place candidates in ballot
positions where they will predictably lose more
votes to foreseeable human error, they dilute the
votes of the supporters of those candidates and vio-
late their first amendment rights.
Courts have varied in their responses to concerns
about voter error in other contexts. Some courts have
found potential constitutional violations when some
voters must use voting technology that leads to
more mistakes, observing that a state may not
‘‘value one person’s vote over that of another,’’
even if the state ‘‘does not know the faces of those
people whose votes get valued less.’’199 Other courts,
however, have dismissed concerns about voter error
as ‘‘de minimis,’’ and have found that democratically
elected legislatures may decide to accept the burden
of voter error on the election process.200
Further, even if plaintiffs could convince a court
that fixed-position ballots are unconstitutional,
rotation may not result. Courts cannot draft legis-
lation; the most they can do is to declare existing
legislation unconstitutional. Indeed, when the Sev-
enth Circuit declared fixed-position ballots in Illi-
nois to be unconstitutional, the state legislature
responded by drafting another fixed-position bal-
lot statute that divided major and minor parties
into two tiers, even though the court ruling had
ordered the state to devise a ‘‘neutral’’ system
that took minor parties into account.201
197See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000) (‘‘Equal pro-
tection applies.to the manner of [the] exercise [of the right to
vote]. Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the
State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value
one person’s vote over that of another.’’) (citing Harper v. Vir-
ginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. at 665).
198Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 105 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 555 (1964)).
199Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, 899 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(denying motion to dismiss Voting Rights Act and equal protection
claims challenging use of voting systems with lower accuracy rates
in some Illinois counties and reasoning that when the state allows
the use of ‘‘voting systems with greatly varying accuracy rates’’ in
different counties in the state, it ‘‘‘value[s] one person’s vote over
that of another’.even if it does not know the faces of those people
whose votes get valued less. This system does not afford the ‘equal
dignity owed to each voter.’’’ (citing Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at
104–05). See also Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 858 (6th
Cir. 2006) (reversing decision denying relief to plaintiffs who
claimed equal protection and voting rights violations based on
use of voting technology with high error rates in some counties,
and observing that ‘‘[v]ote dilution, of course, while just as effec-
tive as an outright denial of the franchise, may be accomplished in
many ways, both intentionally and unintentionally, in a manner
that does not immediately shock the senses as would an outright
denial. This is not a reason, however, to be any less cognizant of
the Equal Protection Clause implications.’’). This decision was
subsequently superseded and the trial court’s decision vacated
due to the state’s agreement to abandon challenged voting technol-
ogy. Stewart v. Blackwell, 473 F.3d 692, 692 (6th Cir. 2007).
200Weber v. Shelley, 347 F.3d at 1107. In Weber, the court con-
cluded that the use of DRE machines that lacked a voter-verified
paper trail did not violate equal protection or due process, even
though these machines did not allow certain methods of ballot
recounts, because ‘‘democratically-elected state officials’’ must
‘‘weigh the pros and cons’’ of various systems, and ‘‘[s]o long as
their choice is reasonable and neutral, it is free from judicial sec-
ond-guessing.’’ The court went on to explain, ‘‘California made a
reasonable, politically neutral and non-discriminatory choice to
certify touchscreen systems as an alternative to paper bal-
lots. Nothing in the Constitution forbids this choice.’’ See also
Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d
at 919–20 (en banc decision refusing to enjoin election until
punchcard systems could be replaced, finding that it was ‘‘merely
a speculative possibility’’ that the expected denial of the right to
vote caused by the punchcard ballots would ‘‘influence the results
of the election’’).
201Sangmeister v. Woodard, 565 F.2d at 466–68. The Sangmeis-
ter court found a fourteenth amendment violation when county
clerks placed candidates of their own party in the top ballot posi-
tion. The court reversed the part of the district court opinion that
required ballot rotation, issuing instead an order that required
that the ballot ordering method be ‘‘neutral’’ and take major
and minor parties into account. Id. Two years later, however,
the Seventh Circuit held that a two-tiered fixed-position ballot
system was constitutional, even though the system essentially
guaranteed the top two spots on the ballot to the two major polit-
ical parties. Bd. of Election Com’rs v. Libertarian Party, 591
F.2d 22, 27 (7th Cir. 1979). In a dissent, Judge Swygert argued
that the procedure invidiously discriminated against minor par-
ties, noting that ‘‘[b]y approving a procedure which prevents a
minor or ‘non-established’ party [a]s such from ever attaining
the top ballot position, the majority has effectively negated the
order of this court in Sangmeister.’’ Id. at 28 (Swygert, J., dis-
senting). In contrast, in February of 2012, the Middle District
of Tennessee specifically found unconstitutional a popularity-
based system of ordering the ballot. Green Party of Tennessee
v. Hargett, 700 F.3d at 829. The statute at issue in Hargett
required the ‘‘majority’’ party to be listed first, followed by
other parties, in order of popularity. The court’s holding, how-
ever, specifically refused to mandate rotation, agreeing with
the plaintiffs that drawing lots could be appropriate. Id. The
court’s order was reversed and the case remanded by the Sixth
Circuit in November of that same year. 700 F.3d at 818. The
Sixth Circuit observed that the plaintiffs’ facial challenge to
the statute required that they meet a high evidentiary burden,
and noted that plaintiffs had not submitted evidence of studies
specifically involving Tennessee’s ballots. Id. at 821.
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Accordingly, those who wish for ballot rotation
legislation might do well to cut out the middle-
man/court and take their concerns directly to the
legislature.
B. Legislation
There are at least three ways that rotation-
mandating constitutional provisions or legislation
could come about. First, Congress could enact legis-
lation to mandate or encourage rotation; second, con-
cerned citizens or public interest groups could use
the initiative process to enact constitutional provi-
sions or statutes; and third, state legislatures could
do so on their own. Perhaps surprisingly, the third
option may be the most likely, but only if legislatures
understand that primacy-effect votes are not the only
position-influenced votes that can swing an election.
Theoretically, Congress could mandate or encour-
age ballot rotation, either by exercising its authority
over congressional elections under the Elections
Clause or by providing financial incentives through
its Spending Clause power, but neither is likely to
occur. HAVA, for example, was enacted after major
problems with the use of punchcard ballots were
exposed, but it did not contain a voting technology
mandate. Instead, HAVA made funding available to
states that wished to update punchcard voting sys-
tems; to the extent HAVA laid out voting technology
guidelines, Congress specifically left execution of
those guidelines to the states.202 And since HAVA,
Congress has shown little willingness to intervene
in state and local election administration. Thus, it is
likely that states will retain the power to decide
whether to use rotated or fixed-position ballots.
Concerned citizens or public interest groups are
also unlikely to press for ballot rotation through
the initiative process. At this time in history, with
so many voting issues on the public stage,203 rota-
tion concerns are understandably ignored. The Car-
ter-Baker Commission was all but silent as to ballot
rotation, and other reform groups may not have the
issue on their radar, focusing instead on more direct
and more visible threats to the franchise.204 The
impact of position-influenced votes—like that of
many problems that result from weak election infra-
structure205—is usually invisible. Although fixed-
position ballots tend to direct position-influenced
votes to the same set of candidates, that surplus
may be no more than .25–5% of the vote in most
elections.206 If the margin of victory is a large
one, that surplus is irrelevant and unnoticed. Bal-
lot-flaw-induced votes may be noticed in a close
election, but only if, as in Palm Beach County in
2000, those votes contradict reliable predictors.207
Further, even in an electoral catastrophe, primacy-
effect votes and proximity-mistake votes would
remain invisible; their causes are subtle, they are
often unrecognized by those affected, and they
occur even on ballots that are well-designed and
that allow voters to review and change their votes.
Accordingly, it is likely that theproblemofposition-
influenced votes will never be the focus of national or
even statewide attention, even if and when those votes
change the outcomes of elections. Therefore, we can-
not expect the public to demand a change to fixed-
202See 42 U.S.C. x 15302 (‘‘A state shall use the funds provided
under a payment under this section.to replace punch card vot-
ing systems or lever voting systems.with a voting sys-
tem.that.does not use punch cards or levers. . . .’’); see
also 42 U.S.C. x 15485 (‘‘The specific choices on the methods
of complying with the requirements of this subchapter shall be
left to the discretion of the State.’’) (referring to Subchapter III,
regarding uniform and nondiscriminatory election technology
and administration requirements).
203E.g., Ethan Bronner, Legal Battles Erupt Over Tough Voter
ID Laws, N.Y. Times, July 19, 2012, available at < http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/07/20/us/politics/tougher-voter-id-
laws-set-off-court-battles.html?ref = us > (discussing legal
battles over statutes requiring photo identification at the
polls).
204Indeed, in a recent book that argues that we should create a
ranking system for election systems as a way to use public
pressure to spur reform, rotation is not mentioned. Gerken,
supra note 32. The book advocates a performance goal that
‘‘every ballot cast is counted properly.’’ Id. at 30. This goal
is a laudable one, but achieving it does nothing for the voters
whose votes are cast inaccurately due to ballot design flaws or
due to their support for a candidate placed by operation of law
in a disfavored position on the ballot. The 2,000-plus ‘‘extra’’
butterfly ballot votes for Pat Buchanan in the 2000 presiden-
tial election in Palm Beach County were counted properly;
the problem was that the ballot design led them to be cast
improperly.
205See Gerken, supra note 32, at 23 (noting the problem of
local control of elections is exacerbated because ‘‘the costs
of deferred maintenance [of election infrastructure] are
mostly invisible to voters. When a problem is invisible,
local competition gives politicians every reason to neglect
it’’).
206See supra, text accompanying notes 21–24.
207Wand et al., supra note 13, at 803 (analyzing the aberrant
vote for Pat Buchanan in the Bush v. Gore election in light of
previous voter behavior in Palm Beach County, with a particu-
lar focus on how few voters in the county had voted for
Buchanan in a previous election).
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position ballots.208 It does not seem likely that any
individual or that reform group will be sufficiently
motivated to go through the considerable time and
expense of putting ballot rotation on the ballot.209
Thus, with courts hesitant about the unconstitu-
tionality of fixed-position ballots, and election
reformers looking elsewhere, it is up to state legis-
lators to enact precinct-level rotation on their own.
Herrnson et al. have observed that election officials
who are ‘‘concerned with fairness’’ should rotate
candidate names in order to ‘‘distribut[e] the odds
of losing votes to [proximity] mistake equally
across candidates.’’210 Indeed, state legislators
have two noble reasons to enact rotation legislation,
and at least one selfish reason.
The first noble reason is that rotation legislation is
good policy due to everyday fairness concerns. Rota-
tion distributes fairly the benefits of perceived and
actual primacy-effect votes, as well as—as Herrnson
et al. indicate—other position-influenced votes. As
discussed earlier, current ballot ordering laws show
that politicians believe that primacy effect exists,211
and political and psychological researchers have
argued for decades that primacy effect skews
some election results.212 Precinct-level rotation
can promote electoral integrity by mitigating or
eliminating the impact—if any—of primacy-effect
votes, and the impacts of less-studied proximity-
mistake votes and ballot-flaw-induced votes.
Those who argue that rotation is not good policy
often advance one of three justifications: (1) that
rotation increases the expense of elections;213 (2)
that rotation will cause ‘‘voter confusion’’;214 or
(3) that rotation will inhibit the effective use of uni-
form sample ballots.215 None of these factors impo-
ses enough of a cost to forego the benefits of ballot
rotation.
Although courts have often been willing to
accept monetary concerns as a justification for
fixed-position ballot statutes,216 there are few indi-
cations that these concerns should force states to
reject rotation. In a 1998 case that specifically
addressed the costs of ballot rotation, the State of
Alaska argued, in essence, that fixed-position bal-
lots advanced an interest in saving money, to the
tune of $64,024 per election cycle.217 While the
plaintiff argued that this amount constituted ‘‘a neg-
ligible and insignificant .00005% of the State’s
$5,000,000,000 budget during that time,’’ the court
noted that ‘‘the more relevant comparison lies
with the ballot budget, which was $469,026.75 for
the 1994 year. The cost savings from eliminating
rotational ballots would thus be approximately
13.7% of the ballot budget.’’218
208E.g., Gerken, supra note 32, at 25–26 (‘‘Partisanship and
localism combine to create a system that is deeply flawed and
resistant to change. When politics work badly, partisanship
taints the way elections are administered and makes the foxes
reluctant to give up guarding the henhouse. When politics
work well, states and localities compete to fund projects that
voters can see, and neglect problems that voters can’t. In both
cases, our election system suffers. The perils of partisanship
and the problems of localism explain why a cause as appealing
as election reform has yet to take root.’’).
209Ohio voters passed a ballot rotation constitutional amend-
ment that was apparently put forward as a defensive ploy by
Republican loyalists. See Roberts II, supra note 42, at 1–2 (not-
ing that the Republican party and supporters of Robert Taft
financed the campaign to support a ballot initiative that
would change Ohio ballots from a party column form that
allowed straight ticket voting to an office block form, as a result
of a fear that straight-ticket Democratic voters re-electing a
popular governor would cost Taft his senate seat).
210Herrnson et al., supra note 18, at 71 (referring to the issue
of unequally distributed proximity errors).
211E.g.,Weisberg v. Powell, 417 F.2d at 393 (discussing behav-
ior of candidates and their representatives who camped out
overnight for a chance to be first on the ballot).
212E.g., Bain and Hecock supra note 87, at 85 (asserting in
1957 that they found ‘‘statistically significant evidence of posi-
tion effect in primary and non-partisan elections in several
Michigan cities..’’).
213E.g., Graves v. McElderry, 946 F. Supp. 1569, 1574 (W.D.
Okla. 1996) (finding that a Democrats-first ballot violated the
equal protection clause, but observing that ‘‘[i]t is unrefuted
in the Court record that the implementation of any kind of rotat-
ing ballot system in Oklahoma General Elections.would be
both costly and burdensome for the State to implement and
administer.’’).
214E.g., id. (finding that a Democrats-first ballot violated the
equal protection clause, but observing that ‘‘[i]t is unrefuted
in the Court record that the implementation of any kind of rotat-
ing ballot system in Oklahoma General Elections.would
result in a ballot format that is potentially confusing to vot-
ers.’’).
215E.g., Sonneman v. State, 969 P.2d at 640 (‘‘Reducing voter
confusion is also an important objective. Since the actual ballots
will be identical to the sample ballots, the amendment may help
prevent such confusion.’’).
216E.g., Graves v. McElderry, 946 F. Supp. at 1574 (noting that
‘‘any kind of rotating ballot system’’ would be ‘‘costly’’); Sonne-
man v. State, 969 P.2d at 639 (discussing cost issues as appropri-
ate justification for change from rotated to fixed-position ballots).
See also Miller, supra note 39, at 403 (citations omitted).
217Sonneman v. State, 969 P.2d at 639.
218Id.
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The Sonneman court noted the costs of ‘‘printing
the ballots,’’219 but this language may have been
inadvertent, since both rotated and non-rotated bal-
lots must be printed. It would make sense that the
main extra cost would occur in the planning and
design of the ballot, and determining how to accom-
plish the various rotation cycles needed for the mul-
tiple contests and multiple precincts at issue. There
might also be extra costs in setting up ballot counting
systems.220 Depending on the systems used, however,
certain computer programs might be able to be re-
used, or could be easily adapted, thus saving costs
in the long run.221 Further, the fact that several states
currently use rotated ballots is a strong indicator that
rotation is not prohibitively expensive.222 Regardless
of expense, states should balance the financial costs
of rotation against the cost in voter confidence that
they pay after an electoral meltdown.223
Some states that have defeated arguments in favor
of rotated ballots have claimed that the state has a
compelling interest in ‘‘avoiding voter confusion,’’224
a claim that too many plaintiffs and courts take at face
value, as if believing that the voter will see a ballot
rotating in the voting booth itself. There is little evi-
dence that voter confusion is a valid concern in the
rotation context. Voter confusion has not, apparently,
been a significant issue in the states that use rotation,
although candidates have sometimes contested elec-
tion results based on a state’s failure to follow proper
rotation procedures.225 Alvarez et al. reference the
unusually large California recall election and claim
that rotation would inhibit effective campaigning,
lamenting that under California’s rotation system,
‘‘a candidate in the 135-person race to replace Gover-
nor Gray Davis on the 2003 California gubernatorial
recall ballot could not campaign with a simple slogan,
‘Vote for Smith, Number 118 on your ballot.’’’226
Despite the limits on this type of ‘‘vote for number
118’’ campaign, there are no indications that voter
confusion played a large role in the California recall.
Elizabeth Garrett analyzed the impact of voter confu-
sion in that election, noting both the use of rotation
and the large candidate pool as two of several features
that could cause confusion.227 Garrett discusses some
of the problems with the voting in that election, but
observes that none of them were ‘‘substantial enough
to affect the outcome,’’ and she concludes that ‘‘the
recall experience suggests that most voters are able
to cope with some complexity in ballots.’’228
Indeed, Garrett argues that too many accept at
face value the ‘‘voter confusion’’ claim (usually
used to argue against broad ballot access), noting
219Id. at 639.
220Miller, supra note 39, at 403 (noting that when fixed-position
ballots are used, ‘‘vote-counting machines do not need to be
programmed with the ballot format from each electoral dis-
trict’’).
221See alsoAlvarez et al., supra note 90, at 52 (indicating that elec-
tronic voting may decrease some costs associated with rotation).
222See alsoMiller, supra note 39, at 403 (observing that the cost
of rotation is ‘‘more than.de minimis’’ but that it ‘‘seems a
rather minor cost when compared with the nature of the harm
involved,’’ and that ‘‘a number of states and local governments
currently employ rotation schemes without seriously crippling
their election budgets’’).
223Harold M. Ickes, Bobby R. Burchfield, Trevor Potter, Wil-
liam P. Marshall, Edward B. Foley, Samuel Issacharoff, Richard
H. Pildes, and Richard L. Hasen, Roundtable: How the Rules
Shaped the 2004 Election. A Discussion Held On November
15, 2004, at the Library of Congress ad Moderated by Spencer
A. Overton (A Symposium on the Law Governing Our Demo-
cratic Process) 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1274, 1293 (2005)
(from remarks of Rick Hasen: ‘‘[T]he main short-term and I
fear longer-term cost of this potential for electoral meltdown
is we’ve seen a marked decline in public trust in the electoral
process.’’); see also Hasen, supra note 181, at 972 (Hasen dis-
cusses a voter registration and identification plan and observes
that ‘‘[o]n the cost point, good election administration is expen-
sive. The costs should not be compared to the cost of doing
nothing, but to the expected value of the reduction in the chan-
ces of post-litigation meltdown created by enacting this pro-
posal. Meltdown threatens the very fabric of our democracy,
and the nation should be prepared to pay significant sums to
avoid it.’’).
224E.g., Schaefer v. Lamone, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 96855 at *7,
*8, *13 (finding no equal protection violation in statute that
requires alphabetical ordering of candidates and finding that pre-
venting voter confusion was a compelling interest); Graves v.
McElderry, 946 F. Supp. at 1574 (finding that a Democrats-
first ballot violated the equal protection clause, but observing
that a rotation ballot would be ‘‘potentially confusing’’ to voters).
225In an unusual and controversial decision involving rotation, a
California trial court overturned the results of an election due to
an alleged failure to follow proper rotation procedure; the deci-
sion was reversed. Bradley v. Perrodin, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 402,
417 (Ct. App. 2003) (finding that trial court erred by transfer-
ring votes from one candidate to another based on theory of pri-
macy effect because law allows only that illegal votes may be
‘‘discarded’’). See also In re Election of Nov. 6, 1990 for Office
of Atty. Gen. of Ohio, 569 N.E.2d 447, 457 (Ohio 1991) (refus-
ing to invalidate election results despite failure of elections offi-
cials to rotate candidate names properly, finding that contestor
did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that election
results would have been different with correct rotation).
226Alvarez et al., supra note 90, at 52–53.
227Garrett, supra note 90, at 255–56.
228Id. at 257. Garrett does not discuss any particular problems
caused by rotation, although she does acknowledge that it
required ‘‘that effective voter education using sample ballots
had to be different in each district.’’ Id. at 256.
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that ‘‘[v]irtually none of the judicial cases includes
actual evidence of voter confusion; instead, mere
assertion of this phenomenon is usually accepted
as a sufficient state interest to protect the regulation
from constitutional attack.’’229 After analyzing the
results of the California recall, Garrett suggests
that ‘‘state officials relying on voter confusion to
support stringent regulation of ballot access ought
to be required to provide more than mere assertions
in the political and judicial arenas. Courts should be
more skeptical of these claims and understand that
they are likely to be superficially neutral rationales
offered for regulations designed to protect the two
major parties and to lock out new voices.’’230
Often when making voter confusion claims, oppo-
nents of precinct-level rotation have also expressed
concern that rotation will inhibit the ability to distrib-
ute a uniform and supposedly effective sample bal-
lot,231 but this concern is also ill-founded. First, the
publication and distribution of sample ballots is not
a perfect exercise.232 Admittedly, moving from
fixed-position ballots to rotated ballots might require
some adjustment in the use of sample ballots, but
this adjustment would not be an insurmountable prob-
lem. Political parties have always provided ‘‘voting
guides,’’ and they could adjust their guides to focus
on the names of the endorsed candidates, without
focusing on where the candidate names would hap-
pen to appear on the contest list. In most elections,
where there are far fewer candidates than in the
135-candidate California recall, there would seem-
ingly be little difference between finding ‘‘the second
name’’ and finding a particular candidate’s name.
States that use rotated ballots employ a variety of
means to provide ‘‘sample’’ ballots. Idaho, for
example, displays a sample ballot with a notation
that the voter’s actual ballot on Election Day may
show candidates in a different order.233 Further,
the fractured, multi-jurisdictional, multi-contest
nature of American elections means that often, the
only sample ballot that could be both accurate and
complete would be a precinct-level ballot. In fact,
in some counties in Ohio, voters can enter their
name and address on the board of elections website
and access their precinct’s specific ballot.234 This
practice may well become common as more of the
population gains computer access.
The concerns about sample ballots often focus on
whether the lack of a uniform sample ballot will inter-
fere with a voter’s ability to ‘‘find’’ the candidate
name on the ballot.235 Some of the scholarship
about the California recall, however, shows that lit-
tle-known candidates received a bump in votes in
assembly districts whose ballots placed their names
adjacent to one of the three most popular candi-
dates.236 Researchers surmise that some or most of
those who voted for the little-known candidates
were intending to vote for one of the three well-
229Id. at 255 (citing Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,
520 U.S. 351, 370 (1997) (holding that antifusion laws prohib-
iting candidates from being affiliated on a ballot with multiple
political parties do not violate first and fourteenth amendment
associational rights); Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479
U.S. 189, 195–96 (1986) (finding constitutional a Washington
statute providing that minor party candidates who receive less
than one percent of votes cast in a primary election can not
have their names placed on general election ballots).
230Id. at 257 (citations omitted).
231E.g., Sonneman v. State, 969 P.2d at 640 (endorsing a change
to fixed-position ballots, noting that ‘‘the actual ballots will be
identical to the sample ballots, [so] the amendment may help
prevent [voter] confusion.’’).
232As one commentator noted about the sample ballots pub-
lished in Palm Beach County, Florida in 2000, ‘‘[t]he sample
ballots available to voters prior to Election Day contained a
material omission, as they did not show the placement of the
punch holes running down the center of the ballot. They also
contained instructions directing voters to mark their preferences
to the right of the candidates’ names, even though, for some
candidates, one would mark a preference to the left of the can-
didates’ names. Thus, the sample ballot gave voters no notice of
the ballot confusion problems awaiting them on Election Day.’’
Steven J. Mulroy, Substantial Noncompliance and Reasonable
Doubt: How the Florida Courts Got It Wrong in the Butterfly
Ballot Case, 14 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 203, 225 (2003) (citing
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint at 11, Fladell v. Palm
Beach County Canvassing Bd., No. CL 00-10965 AB (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Nov. 20, 2000)); see also Niemi and Herrnson, supra
note 13, at 317 (noting that in Duval County, Florida in the
year 2000, the names of presidential candidates were spread
over two pages, even though a sample ballot had been distrib-
uted with the instruction to ‘‘vote every page’’).
233In Idaho, images of sample ballots contain the legend ‘‘Note:
The order of the candidates on this sample ballot may not nec-
essarily reflect the rotation in your precinct on election day.’’
E.g., < http://www.canyonco.org/Elected-Officials/Clerk/
Clerk-Elections/2012-General-Election/2012-General_Canyon
Sample.aspx > . Idaho Code x 34-903 gives the Secretary of
State the authority to rotate names on the ballot in Idaho.
234< http://vote.franklincountyohio.gov/me/> . In Ohio’s Cler-
mont County, in contrast, voters are told that sample ballots
‘‘may not have your exact corresponding Precinct listed, but
the Candidates and Issues are the same ones you will be voting
on.’’ Boards of Elections might also consider generating pre-
cinct-level sample ballots and mailing or emailing these ballots
to voters.
235E.g., Schaefer v. Lamone, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96855 at
*8 (‘‘An alphabetical system makes it easier for voters to find
the candidate of their choice on the ballot.’’).
236Luttmer and Shue, supra note 23, at 17. The researchers con-
cluded that proximity (or ‘‘adjacency’’) rather than name confu-
sion drove the misvotes. Id.
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known candidates.237 Presumably, these voters had
found the name of their preferred candidate; they
had trouble, however, accurately casting the vote.
Thus, because an ‘‘accurate’’ sample ballot will not
necessarily advance accurate voting, the benefits of
rotation apparently outweigh the costs—if any—of
a different kind of sample ballot system.
Enacting precinct-level rotation is also good pol-
icy because it provides a fail-safe benefit that can
help states to avoid electoral catastrophe. The
2000 election revealed the problems caused by
punchcard ballots and hanging chads, and one
goal of the Help America Vote Act was to prevent
another Florida-style electoral meltdown.238 While
precinct-level rotation will not eliminate the impact
of all types of electoral problems, it can certainly
help to mitigate the impact of a variety of ballot-de-
sign issues, including misalignment of candidate
names on the ballot239 and problems caused by
late-in-the-season disqualification of candidates.240
It is at least possible that precinct-level rotation
would have changed the result in Florida in the
2000 election, even with no change to the severely
flawed ballot design.241 Whatever the election’s
result, however, the use of precinct-level rota-
tion—by spreading among all candidates the impact
of the problems caused by the butterfly ballot242—
would have increased the confidence of the Ameri-
can people in the integrity of the election’s results.
In tort law, jurors deciding whether a product
design is appropriate may consider whether the
manufacturer has designed the product to avoid
harms caused by the ‘‘foreseeable misuse’’ of the
product.243 Likewise, those who make and interpret
the laws that govern ballot design should take into
account foreseeable ‘‘misuse’’ of the ballot—both
by those who design it and those who use it to
vote—and implement rotation systems to mitigate
or eliminate the impact of that misuse.
Even if legislators are not motivated by noble rea-
sons, there may also be a selfish reason to enact ballot
rotation statutes. Admittedly, rotation may marginally
improve the odds of success for candidates in the non-
major parties by giving them the coveted top spot on a
portion of the ballots. State legislatures—in general,
dominated by the two major parties—might therefore
be unmotivated to pass a statute that mandates rota-
tion.244 Legislators might be more motivated, how-
ever, if they understand that their candidates could
be victims of a systemic failure of butterfly ballot
magnitude, or even that their candidates may end
up on fixed-position ballots in disfavored positions
that would cause them to lose votes to proximity mis-
takes or other problems.245
Once again, the recent researchmay help to change
the conventional wisdom. Apparently due to a focus
on primacy effect, many non-rotation states have bal-
lot positioning statutes that put the two major
parties in the top two positions on the ballot.246
237See id. at 32 (observing that ‘‘[a]djacency misvoting has
important electoral implications because votes gained by adja-
cent candidates are votes lost by major candidates’’).
238Lillie Coney, E-Voting: A Tale of Lost Votes, 23 J. Mar-
shall J. Computer & Info. L. 509, 510 (2005) (‘‘HAVA’s sta-
ted goal was to prevent another Florida 2000 Presidential
election, which held the nation in limbo regarding who would
be the next President of the United States, due to a number of
factors, including faulty voting machines.’’).
239Roth, supra note 126, at 4–5 (noting that voters were con-
fused by misalignment of names and voting levers).
240Norden et al., supra note 12, at 32 (citing Reid, Nader’s
Name Is on the Ballot, But You Can’t Cast a Vote For Him,
Cincinnati Enquirer, Oct. 20, 2004, at 5B).
241See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
242As the Supreme Court observed in 2008, voter confidence is
important because it ‘‘encourages citizen participation in the
democratic process.’’ Crawford v. Marion County Election
Bd., 553 U.S. at 197.
243E.g., Ridenour v. Bat ’Em Out, 707 A.2d 1093, 1096 (N.J.
Super. 1998) (‘‘As to the defendants who are subject to statutory
or common law products liability exposure, plaintiff has the
burden of showing that his misuse by pushing and rocking the
machine was objectively foreseeable. It is for the jury to deter-
mine whether such manner of misuse was objectively foresee-
able.’’); see also Makadji v. GPI Div. of Harmony
Enterprises, Inc., 2007 WL 1521221 at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 23,
2007) (‘‘Plaintiff’s claim that the [product] should have been
designed to avoid foreseeable misuse is a tenable legal
theory.’’).
244E.g.,Gerken, supra note 32, at 19 (‘‘The people who decide
who decides—the federal and state legislators who have the
power to place our election system in the hands of nonparti-
sans—are partisans themselves. And if you are the party in con-
trol, what incentive do you have to abandon this important
weapon in your political arsenal? It’s not a coincidence that
election reform proposals tend to come from the party out of
power, which loses interest in reform the moment it gains a
majority of seats.’’).
245See Roberts II, supra note 42, at 1–2 (noting that the Repub-
lican party and supporters of Robert Taft financed the campaign
to support a ballot initiative that would change Ohio ballots
from a straight ticket/party column ballot to an office block
form with rotation, as a result of a fear that straight-ticket Dem-
ocratic voters who would be voting to re-elect a popular gover-
nor would cost Taft his senate seat).
246E.g., Fla. Stats. Ann. x 101.151 (putting in first position
the candidates of the party that received the most votes in the
Governor’s race, with candidates of other parties following
in order based on the gubernatorial vote); Colo. Rev. Stats.
x 1-5-404 (awarding the top two slots to the candidates from
the two major parties, with candidates of other parties following
in two tiers).
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These ballot-ordering laws indicate that legislators
believe that the top spot in the contest is the best
spot, and the second spot is the second-best spot.
Recent research, however, shows that this belief
may not be accurate in contests with more than
two candidates. The findings on proximity mistakes
indicate that major-party candidates may be losing
votes to position-influenced votes when those can-
didates appear in their guaranteed number-two
spots in contests with three or more candidates.247
Moving major party candidates to the bottom of a
fixed-position ballot may not be the best solution
for these candidates, however. Although the bottom
spot on the candidate list lessens the likelihood of
proximity mistakes, on some multi-candidate bal-
lots it may increase the likelihood of losing a vote
due to satisficing248 or other issues. Thus, legisla-
tors need to understand that there are different
kinds of disfavored positions on the contest list,
and that a fixed-position ballot is not always in
the best interests of their party’s candidates.
Future research may identify more precisely
which spots are the best and the worst in contests
with certain numbers of candidates. For example,
spot #2 might be identified as the worst spot in a
three-candidate contest, as the second worst in a
four-candidate contest, and the second-best in a
two-candidate contest. Since the number of candi-
dates often varies unpredictably from contest to
contest and from election to election, the second-
best ballot position (as well as the worst ballot posi-
tion) would vary unpredictably as well. This infor-
mation might therefore motivate legislators to
enact rotation legislation to ensure that their candi-
dates do not wind up in the worst position on the
contest list on a fixed-position ballot.
Further, some scholars argue that primacy-effect
votes are most likely to occur in down-ticket con-
tests.249 These contests, while often less glamorous,
select the officeholders that provide patronage jobs
and, more importantly, help officeholders develop
their political reputations and build name recogni-
tion that will promote their election to higher offices
down the road. It is reasonable that proximity-
mistake votes are more likely to affect these con-
tests as well, since voters, as discussed earlier,
may be less likely to correct mistakes in these con-
tests, even if the voters are made aware of them.
More significantly, current research shows that
voter mistakes are more likely to occur when voters
must cast multiple votes in a single contest,250 a fact
which might make state-level legislators more will-
ing to implement rotation for the sake of their local-
level party comrades.
State legislators, therefore, have self-interested
reasons to enact precinct-level rotation. First, both
major parties are probably routinely losing vote
share to position-influenced votes in statewide elec-
tions. Further, their local-level party comrades are
also losing votes to these predictable voter behav-
iors, especially in the multi-vote contests—such as
city council and school board—that are common
at the local level.
Admittedly, legislatures might be unwilling to
change to a rotated ballot if they sit in states that
award the top ballot position to the party in power
in a state with a long-dominant party. In lottery
states, however, and in states in which the party in
power shifts back and forth, legislators of both par-
ties—who know that their party’s candidates may
appear in a disfavored spot on a fixed-position bal-
lot—may recognize the value of equalizing the ben-
efits and burdens of the various positions on the
ballot, and enact rotation voluntarily.
Thus, rotation statutes can be justified by reasons
of both partisanship and public policy. By enacting
precinct-level rotation, state legislatures can protect
all candidates from the impact of primacy effect and
voter error. Just as important, they can help to main-
tain voter confidence by demonstrating that the state
is doing its part to fairly distribute the impact of the
mistakes that can occur in any activity in which
human beings are involved.
V. CONCLUSION
Losing candidates and election reformers have
been attacking fixed-position ballots for genera-
tions, claiming that these ballots unfairly benefit
247Herrnson et al., supra note 18, at 195 n. 16 (finding that
candidates located in the middle of a list lose more votes to
proximity mistakes than those located at the top and bottom
of the list); Luttmer and Shue, supra note 23, at 32 (analyzing
misvotes in the 2003 California gubernatorial recall election).
248E.g., Brockington, supra note 83, at 4–5; see also Simon,
supra note 83, at 118–20.
249E.g., Augenblick and Nicholson, supra note 12, at 23 (find-
ing that the lower the ballot position of a contest, the higher the
number of undervotes or primacy-effect votes).
250Herrnson et al., supra note 18, at 78–80 (finding that mis-
takes increased when voters had to choose more than one can-
didate in a contest).
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candidates in the top position. Unfortunately, they
have focused almost exclusively on problems
caused by primacy effect, an issue that presents an
unsympathetic picture. The problem of primacy-ef-
fect votes is a real one, but too many have a hard
time seeing beyond voters whom they perceive to
be ignorant or, at best, easily influenced. Further,
lawsuits that seek to overturn fixed-position ballot
statutes based on primacy-effect votes alone are
asking courts to change laws based on the ‘‘prob-
lem’’ of valid, accurately-cast votes.
Recent research on ballot-flaw-induced votes and
proximity-mistake votes, however, gives new justi-
fications to those trying to move states to use ballot
rotation. This research shows that certain flawed
ballot designs lead to predictable mistakes; more
importantly, other research shows that voter mis-
takes are predictable when candidate names are
located in certain positions, even on well-designed
ballots. Although more research will be done, the
current research seems to show that candidates in
specific positions on a ballot may lose up to 2–3%
of their votes due to unavoidable human error.
Since many elections are decided by margins
smaller than 1%, candidates can argue that being
slotted into disfavored positions on a fixed-position
ballot is a constitutional violation. Perhaps more
importantly, state legislators in the two dominant
parties may recognize that the best way to ensure
that they themselves will not lose a disproportionate
number of votes to proximity mistake is to pass
rotation statutes that ensure that each candidate’s
name is located in each position on the contest list
in an approximately equal number of precincts.
Some reformers—or some who are resistant to
reform—may argue that fixed-position ballots are
fine if the candidates for each position are chosen
by lot, in a ‘‘fair’’ procedure. Others may note that
most modern ballots give voters the opportunity to
review their ballots and fix their mistakes. Neither
assignment by lot nor the opportunity to fix mis-
takes solves the problem of fixed-position ballots.
Determining ballot position by lot provides a
veneer of fairness, but the lottery method merely
uses a fair method to impose an unfair result. A
court would not uphold a state law that needlessly
disenfranchised 1–3% of the supporters of certain
specific candidates, even if the candidates who suf-
fered the loss were chosen at random. Fixed-posi-
tion ballots can have exactly that effect. Further,
votes cast in error are worse than residual votes;
while a voter who casts a residual vote may lose
his or her vote in that contest, the voter who casts
a vote in error not only loses a vote for a chosen can-
didate, but awards it to a candidate the voter did not
intend to choose.
Allowing voters to fix their mistakes does not
solve the problem either. While being able to fix
errors is important for many reasons, our knowledge
of human nature—and human voters—tells us that
many voters will not take the time and trouble to
fix mistakes, particularly in down-ballot contests
on our long and complex American ballots. Candi-
dates and their supporters, therefore, have both a
practical and a constitutional interest in being able
to vote as accurately as possible from the start. Fur-
ther, rotated ballots will not only equalize the
impact of primacy effect and proximity-mistake
votes; they provide a fail-safe to prevent electoral
catastrophe resulting from unnoticed and some-
times unavoidable ballot design problems.
Voting should not be a test. States should do
everything they can to make ballots easy to vote
accurately. No matter how much ballots are
improved, however, each ballot will inevitably
include favored and disfavored positions, posi-
tions that impose benefits and burdens on the sup-
porters of the candidates in those positions. These
benefits and burdens can and should be spread as
equally as possible among the supporters of all
candidates in a contest. Existing ballot rotation
systems show that precinct-level rotation is a fis-
cally and technologically feasible way to accom-
plish this goal.
If and when all states move to ballot rotation sys-
tems, we will seldom be aware of the benefits of the
change. A crisis averted is often hard to recognize.
But ballot rotation laws are like seatbelts: we need
to put them in place before we need them. If we
try to wait until an election starts to skid away
from us, we’ll be too late.
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